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ABSTRACT
This thesis considers two issues. The first is whether it is possible to replicate commercial real
estate returns by developing a proxy of publicly traded securities. The second is the possibility of
using publicly traded securities to predict commercial real estate returns, thereby creating a viable
financial instrument in which real estate risk could be hedged. The thesis focuses on the United
Kingdom's real estate market and utilizes the capital appreciation portion of the IPD Monthly
Index, which is unsmoothed to uncover the "real" returns generated by real estate. The
fundamental hypothesis is that there is a link between the stock prices of large users of real estate
and the returns being generated by the real estate they occupy. Our findings suggest that up to
92% of the real estate returns can be replicated using only 15 publicly traded securities. This
strongly suggests that the returns generated by real estate may not be as idiosyncratic as previously
thought and that real estate may not bring any significant diversification benefits to investment
portfolios that are not already available in the public security markets.
Applying these findings to the development of a predictive hedge produced less conclusive results.
Although we were able to develop a methodology that achieved good results over a six month
period, the predictive powers of the hedge on a month to month basis were not strong.
Nonetheless, we believe that our results are encouraging and provide direction for further research,
as a more extensive database becomes available.
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Liquefying Risk in the U.K. Real Estate Market
Chapter 1: Introduction
This thesis will consider the use of publicly traded equities in both replicating and predicting the
returns to direct commercial real estate investment. One of the most challenging problems
concerning real estate investors today is the inherent illiquidity of the asset and the lack of
alternatives that could allow investors the ability to hedge their exposure to real estate. The
creation of such a "return proxy" would allow investors, as well as direct owners of real estate, an
important financial vehicle through which they would be able to isolate and "liquefy" the risk of
their real estate exposure. By utilizing only existing publicly traded equities, the proxy would
have the same liquidity as is currently available to investors in the stock and bond markets. In
addition, investors may be able to utilize the proxy to obtain the diversification benefits of direct
ownership of real estate without the inherent problems that accompany ownership, such
transactions costs and management fees. In fact,
"Direct ownership of real estate may be avoided entirely if a replicating
portfolio of liquid or quasi-liquid securities can be found that matches
returns to real estate."
1.1 Diversification Benefits
The benefits of including real estate in a diversified portfolio have been long studied. Real estate
returns' apparent low correlation with stocks and bonds (0.2 and 0.0, respectively 2) enable
investors to lower the overall volatility in their portfolio for a given return. This is the basis for
rational quantitative investment analysis known as Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT), which was
developed by Markowitz, Sharpe and others in the 1950's and 1960's.
"MPT has provided much of the underlying motivation for including real
estate in the pension fund portfolio, because real estate has been seen as a
potential diversifier of stocks and bonds, which dominate most pension
funds' portfolios."3
Riddiough, 1995.
2 Hartzell, Wurtzebach and Watkins, 1995.
3 Geltner, Rodriguez and O'Conner, 1995.
However, when property values fell during the late 1980's and early 1990's, many investors found
that the asset's illiquidity and high transaction costs made it difficult to reallocate their portfolios
to adjust to real estate's changing risk/return profile, and therefore prohibited the investors from
being able to properly manage their risks.
Numerous studies have also indicated the benefits of diversification within the real estate asset
class itself.
"Regional diversification of real estate portfolios has been shown to
provide benefits to investment managers by reducing the unsystematic
risk associated with the fluctuation of portfolio returns. The two most
important elements of portfolio construction include the creation of
homogeneous categories, in this case geographic areas (as opposed to
product types), and the coefficient of correlation between categories." 4
Both investors and direct property owners could lower their exposure to unsystematic real estate
risk by holding properties in different regions of the country.
"However, the obstacles to investing in large, diversified baskets of
commercial real estate are prohibitive to most investors. Transaction
costs are substantial, and diversification across geographical location and
property type through the physical market would require unrealistically
large sums."5
Direct owners of real estate face an additional problem whereby "the illiquidity in commercial real
estate manifests itself as a near-total lack of hedge markets."6 Due to the high costs of acquiring
and owning real estate, current owners of the asset may be unable to diversify their holdings either
by property type or geographically. This problem typically leaves property owners unable to
reduce their real estate exposure through diversification. That is, property owners are locked into
a "long" position, in terms of the property's rental income and capital appreciation, due to the lack
of a mechanism that would allow them to reduce their market risk by obtaining a "short" position
in their idiosyncratic exposure to real estate.
4 Malizia and Simons, 1991.
5 Kerson, 1994.
6 Ibid.
1.2 Risk Management
No widely accepted mechanism currently exists that allows investors to diversify their investments
in real estate without incurring significant costs. Nor do individuals or institutions with large
exposures to specific real estate risks currently have any way of hedging those risks.
"In order to hedge their portfolio, these owners of real estate should go
short in index-based real estate derivatives that are closely correlated with
the real estate that they live in or operate."7
For various reasons, firms usually prefer to own real estate that they use in connection with their
operations. But they have no mechanism through which they are able to hedge the risk of these
holdings.8
Prior attempts have been made to address the problem of hedging real estate risk, including:
trading property futures contracts on The London Futures and Options Exchange (London FOX);
the Chicago Board Options Exchange REIT Index; a back-to-back swap deal between Morgan
Stanley and Aldrich, Eastman and Waltch, a Boston based fund manager; and the development by
Bankers Trust of a derivative index comprised of public REITs, REOCs and small cap stocks.
These attempts will be discussed in some detail in Chapter 2. However, it is important to note that
none of these efforts have, thus far, been widely accepted or utilized in the marketplace, due to
transaction costs, timing issues and thin volume.
1.3 Research Methodology
To address these problems, an alternative methodology that utilizes only publicly traded equities
to replicate and predict the true returns of real estate will be analyzed. Mechanically, this
approach should have the following advantages. First, the methodology does not require the
formation of any additional financial instruments, such as a derivative index or real estate futures
exchange. Second, since the methodology utilizes only currently existing publicly traded equities,
liquidity should not be a major issue. Third, unlike a back-to-back swap, specific counterparties
do not have to be found for each transaction. Finally, unlike a derivative index which may attempt
to isolate real estate risk from systematic stock market risk by relying primarily on REITs and
7 Kerson, 1994.
8 Case, Shiller and Weiss, 1993.
REOCs to replicate real estate returns, this approach will not have to account for other factors that
differentiate those returns from true real estate returns, i.e., management, growth potential, etc.
Our approach is straight forward. We hypothesize that there exists a strong relationship between
property values and the financial well being of the property's end user. This financial well being
is directly reflected in the stock prices of the end users and may be an indication of their
requirements for property, as well as their ability to pay for that use going forward, i.e., expansion,
upgrades and generally higher leases during good times, and the opposite during periods of
contraction.
"At the least sophisticated level of economic theory lies the belief that
certain pairs of economic variables should not diverge from each other by
too great an extent, at least in the long run."9
Therefore, in the specific case of property values, which are essentially determined by discounting
future net operating income (NOI), there should exist a strong correlation with the present value of
future profits of the end users, which is directly reflected by the company's current stock price. In
a general sense, if a company is projected to do well and to grow, its stock price will increase.
Likewise the company's demand for real estate and its ability to pay for real estate will also
increase. Therefore, one would expect the level of a company's success to be reflected in the
value of the real estate that it requires.
This approach builds upon previous research by others attempting to find fundamental
relationships between returns of privately held real estate and publicly traded real estate related
equities, such as REITs, REOCs, construction companies, etc. For instance, previous attempts by
Henry and Ward (1995) to develop a replicating proxy for the U.K.'s JLW real estate index
utilized stocks, indices, and government bonds "that might be expected to be influenced by the
state of the property market."1 However, instead of focusing on companies whose success is
influenced by the property market, our approach will focus on companies that we believe should
exert influence on the property market.
9 Granger, 1986.
10 Henry and Ward, 1995.
In short, the value of a real estate asset may be directly influenced by the value of its tenants. If a
strong correlation between property valuation and the valuation of the end users can be
established, a proxy for real estate returns could then be established, utilizing only the publicly
traded equities of the companies that represent the users of real estate. Furthermore, this
relationship should also exist on a disaggregated, industry sector basis. By its very nature, such a
proxy would have the liquidity of the public equity markets, including the ability hedge risk by
short selling.
In order to test this hypothesis, we established a two stage process. First, we sought to establish
that it was possible to develop a replicating proxy for real estate returns utilizing only publicly
traded equities. This methodology is described in Chapter 3. Second, based upon the success of
the first stage, we sought to establish a methodology for utilizing the correlation between real
estate returns and returns on public equities to develop a predictive hedge instrument for future
real estate returns. This methodology is described in Chapter 4.
1.4 The United Kingdom Property Market
The U.K. market was chosen for this research because of its geographically concentrated property
market, the availability of monthly real estate return data and relative homogeneity of the property
types. Seventy-five percent of the U.K.'s commercial real estate is located within the London
MSA; consequently, it is appropriate to view the U.K. market as being relatively geographically
homogeneous."' This selection simplified the analysis and provided the opportunity to apply the
methodology to the entire U.K. property market as a whole, disaggregating only by property type.
The Investment Property Databank (IPD) produces several appraisal based real estate indices in
the U.K. We elected to use the IPD index because it contains detailed monthly return data and is
disaggregated into three industry sectors. See Chapter 3.2 for additional discussion. The denser,
more homogeneous U.K. market exhibits less appraisal smoothing than the U.S. market and the
monthly reappraisal of all properties in the IPD Index results in less temporal aggregation than the
U.S. indices with their staggered annual reappraisals. The IPD Monthly Index provides a short
term measure of commercial property market movements based on the performance of the
" Hoesli, MacGregor and Lizieri, 1996.
1 Barkham and Geltner, 1995.
properties held by 53 funds, consisting of property Unit Trusts, Unit Linked Insurance Funds and
Managed Pension Funds, which are valued monthly. The IPD Monthly Index includes over 2250
properties, which are split into three sectors; industrial, office and retail.
In addition, due to the fact that the "U.K. property markets also appear to be more positively
correlated on a contemporary basis, with a broad-based index of the country's stock market,
particularly in the case of the unsecuritized property markets,"13 we believe that there could well
exist a similar relationship between sectorally disaggregated real estate returns and same sector
industry returns. For larger, more diverse markets, such as the United States, the basic approach
would be the same. However, special attention would need to be given to the effects of
geographic diversity and local economic conditions.
Chapter 2: Literature Review and Background
2.1 Appraisal Based Real Estate Return Indices
The real estate industry suffers from a lack of reliable publicly available data on investment
performance. This has made it very difficult to measure the true returns generated on an ongoing
basis.
"The lack of reliable real estate returns data has hampered real estate research and
performance measurement. Real estate is traded infrequently, is not homogenous, and
lacks a central marketplace where prices are made public."Y
Due to this lack of data, practitioners and academics alike have relied heavily on appraisal based
indices to analyze the returns from privately held commercial real estate. Researchers [Giliberto
1988 and Geltner 1989a, b] have realized that appraisal based indices have inherent problems
which, if not corrected, can lead to an inaccurate portrayal of the returns generated by real estate.
This section identifies some of these issues and discusses the methods researchers have formulated
to address them. Specifically the following will be discussed in turn:
1. Bias in appraisal-based returns
2. Appraisal smoothing and temporal aggregation
13Barkham and Geltner, 1995.
14 Eichholtz and Hartzell, pg. 163.
Bias in appraisal-based returns:
Fundamentally, appraisal bias results from fact that actual transactions in real estate are relatively
infrequent. Because of this, real estate property indices are not transaction based but rather must
rely on appraisals to update property valuations. Since appraisers do not have empirical, current
data, they must rely on past valuations of the subject property and past sales prices of comparable
properties. This results in a backward looking bias in the appraiser's valuations. That is, current
valuations contain components of the past valuations. Giliberto [1988] recognized that, with
respect to capital appreciation, appraisal based indices biased the holding period return series for a
portfolio of real estate. The definition of the holding period return (rt) is the difference in value
(V) between two points in time.
rt=Vt/V 1 - 1
Unless the portfolio is actually traded at times t and t- 1 then the actual, or true, returns are
unobservable. In practice, this equation becomes:
r * t=V*t _-1I
where r*t is the observed appraisal based return and V*t is the appraised value of the portfolio at
time t. Realizing that:
Vt=V*t+st
here et is an estimate of the appraisal error and Vt is deterministic, ex post, but also unobservable,
Giliberto modeled the bias in r*t as an estimate of rt, and concluded that appraisal return bias may
exist in the return even though the appraised values in levels are unbiased. He further shows that
the bias will always be positive if the appraisal errors are serially uncorrelated.15
However, Geltner [1989a] notes that,
"The holding period return is useful for measuring the ex post performance of a
portfolio between two points in time. Our analysis suggests that this type of bias
is minor if appraised values in levels are unbiased and the portfolio value has
changed by a large fraction during the holding period (as would often be the case
over a long holding period). Moreover, under some assumptions that may often
be plausible, this bias problem can be avoided by the use of continuously
compounded rate of return over the holding period." 16
In doing so, Geltner assumes that the standard error of the appraised value is a constant fraction of
the true value and that the error terms follow a pattern of a normal distribution. It is important to
15 Geltner, 1989a, pg. 340.
16 Geltner, 1989a, pg. 350.
note that both Giliberto's and Geltner's work centered on the US based Frank Russell Company
(later renamed NCREIF) and PRISA indices.
Appraisal smoothing:
Smoothing has been defined as a "bias towards zero in return time-series second moments."17
Smoothing may enter an appraisal based index at either the aggregate or disaggregate level. There
are two basic causes of smoothing 1:
1. Lack of confidence.
2. Valuation timing.
Lack of confidence: Since the property is not actually sold, the appraiser can not be 100% certain
that the appraisal represents, in fact, the true market value of the property in question. This leads
to a lack of confidence in the appraisal. Defining the appraiser's confidence factor as a , where
0 a 1, then:
V*t=aVt+(1-a)V*t.1 (1)
where Vt is the true property value and V*t-i is the appraisal one period ago. The above "results in
the appraised value at time t being a moving average of current and past true property values."19
Taking the first differences and approximating the returns as the differences in value (rt~V-Vt-i),
implies that "the appraisal-based return is an exponentially weighted moving average of true
returns."2 This leads to the conclusion that most of the risk in the return series is due to capital
appreciation. Further, if one uses continuously compounded returns rather than holding period
returns, then the above approximation is an exact relationship.
Expanding upon (1) above to reflect a true series, Geltner [1991] shows that:
rt iTlt +woi rt +w1rt-i+... (2)
where q represents the random error term of the appraisal and w is a weighting factor. If the error
is truly random then it will approach zero for a large set of observations, such as in an index.
Accordingly, the value of Equation (2) represents the disaggregate (property) level return while
rt -it represents the index (portfolio) level of returns.
17 Geltner 1993, pg. 141.
18 Geltner 1989b, pg. 469.
19
1 Ibid. pg. 470
20 Ibid.
Valuation timing: Within a portfolio of properties some will have been more recently appraised
than others. This leads to an issue of temporal aggregation, which is defined "as the use of spot
valuations of properties occurring over an interval of time to impute the spot value of a property or
of a real estate value index as of a single point in time."21 The primary reason for issues with
temporal aggregation is due to the lack of a significant volume of contemporaneous transactions.
Geltner [1993] provides a rigorous study of the affects of temporal aggregation, the mathematics
of which will not be repeated here. The conclusions, however, can be summarized as follows:
1. Temporal aggregation affects appraisal based, transaction based and hedonic real
estate indices due to the thinness of the commercial real estate market.
2. Not correcting for the affects of temporal aggregation will cause an over allocation to
real estate when applying modem portfolio theory diversification techniques to
commercial real estate, stocks and bond return series.
3. Temporal aggregation can be almost completely avoided by simply reducing the
frequency of the return series observations to a half or a quarter of the underlying
index. This may, however, lead to other problems by reducing the amount of
disaggregate data.
The net affect of temporal aggregation is that the appraised values will be a moving average of the
underlying true values. The moving average of a stochastic process is a smoothed version of the
underlying stochastic process itself, but displays less variation than the underlying process.
In conclusion, appraisal based indices have problems which are widely known and have been the
subject of much study. "No index is perfect"2 however, and "one can use an index effectively
only when one understands how it was created." With the amount of study that has gone into
appraisal based indices, they can in fact provide a vast amount of information, once corrected for
recognized faults.
2.2 Geographic and Sectoral Diversification
The ability to diversify "within" real estate has been widely studied since the early 1980s. The
objective is that once an investor had made the decision to diversify into real estate, perhaps the
efficient frontier, as defined by modern portfolio theory, could be further moved by investing in
properties with a low covariance between their respective returns.
21 Geltner 1993, pg. 141.
2 Geltner 1989b, pg. 471.
23 DeVries, Miles, Wolgin 1992, pg. 7.
24 Ibid.
In the U.S., geographical delineation, for the purposes of diversification, is typically defined as the
individual states. The NCREIF combines the states into four very broad geographical regions
(East, West, Midwest and South). A study by Hartzell, Hekman and Miles concluded that the four
geographic categories were too broad, and called for a more exacting differentiation based upon
more localized geographical classification and a variety of property specific considerations.25 In
1987, the regional categories were broaden by Hartzell, Shulman and Wurtzebach to a total of
eight categories. Their innovation was not to divide the country along predetermined state
boundaries, but by "cohesive economic activity regions." 26 Their results indicate that the eight
region model provides superior diversification benefits vis-A-vis the four region model.
Mueller further refined the by dividing the country into nine "Economic Base Categories. 27
These categories are based upon the dominant economic base for each of the 316 metropolitan
statistical areas (MSAs) in the U.S. A dominant economic base was defined as the largest sectoral
employer in the MSA as categorized by standard industrial classification (SIC) group. The
economic similarity of the groupings lead to a remarkable geographic diversity as, for example,
Charleston SC, New London CT and San Antonio TX were all in the same group.28 The study
concluded that local economics plays a more important role in diversification than purely
geographic groupings. Interestingly, the proposed model does not perform well during the cycle
from 1983 through 1990, which of course includes the recent downturn in the real estate market.
Mueller postulates that this because much of the construction during this time frame was not
driven by economics, but by investment and tax considerations. 29
The technique of dividing up a large geographic region by similar economic drivers using total
employment as a proxy was applied to Europe by Hartzell, Eichholtz and Selender. With regard to
the U.K., their work showed that the greater London area is dominated by the finance, insurance
and real estate (FIRE) service sector, the West Midlands region surrounding Birmingham by the
metal manufacturing (e.g. automobile industry) and area around Newcastle upon Tyne to the North
by energy. The remainder of the U.K. is considered diversified, or not dominated by any
2 Hartzell, Hekman and Miles 1986, pg. 252.
26 Hartzell, Shulman, Wurtzebach 1987, pg. 86.
27 Mueller, 1993, pg. 56.
282Ibid. pg. 60.
2Ibid. pg. 62.
particular industry. Although the authors are technically correct in stating that "there are no
return data for a general European real estate portfolio"31 there are several indices available in the
U.K. Also, while certainly not available for use by the authors at the time of publishing, an index
has also been started in the Netherlands as of July 1996. One of the recommendations of the study
was to further develop the link between real estate returns and employment characteristics.
Using one of the aforementioned indices (Hillier Parker), Hoesli, Lizeri and MacGregor study
diversification within the U.K. market (with the exception of Northern Ireland due to a lack of
data). The authors use several clustering techniques to attempt to discern whether real estate
returns are grouped by geographic region or by sector. Their methodology acknowledged the
differing economic drivers as defined by the employment segregation technique by Hartzell et al.
Their results found that property type was the most important consideration for diversification
within the real estate markets in the U.K. 33 The sectors identified were retail, London office, and
industrial with the non-London offices closely following the industrial sector. As for geography,
there appears to be some evidence that it does play a role on a very broad basis. That is, the
country is roughly divided into three categories: London, the area surrounding London, and
everywhere else. The London region is dominant. These results have led us to concentrate on the
sectoral disaggregation, and for the purposes of our thesis, to view to U.K. property market as
being geographically homogeneous. 34
2.3 Linking Returns of Public and Private Real Estate
Traditionally, investors desiring exposure to the equity real estate markets simply purchased
property on a debt free basis or allowed their equity to be leveraged with debt. The property
produced income on an ongoing basis with capital appreciation realized at the time of sale or
refinancing. However, in the United States a change in the tax laws in the early 1960s allowed for
the formation of real estate investment trusts (REITs) which were traded daily on stock exchanges.
Provided they followed certain structural rules, REITs were able to deduct dividend payments to
the holders of their stock before paying taxes. For a variety of reasons (which will not be
discussed in this paper), REITs grew to only about $7 billion by the end of the 1980s, but then
30 Hartzell, Eichholtz and Selender 1993, pg. 21.
31 Hartzell, Eichholtz and Selender 1993.
32
33 Hoesli, Lizeri and MacGregor 1996
34 Hoesli, Lizeri and MacGregor 1996
rapidly expanded to about $70 billion by the end of 1995. While many questions still surround
REITs as to whether or not they truly "are real estate", most practitioners and academics believe
that the industry has reached a critical mass and is here to stay.
Several authors [Giliberto 1990, Ross and Zisler 1991, Gyourko and Kiem 1992, et al.] have
explored the relationship between the returns generated by the private and public markets. As was
discussed in chapter 2.1 one of the first obstacles encountered was the difficulty in measuring the
returns generated by privately held real estate. In the U.S., a widely followed index of private real
estate returns was started by the Frank Russell Company and is currently published by the
National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries (NCREIF). The data series starts in 1977
and is compiled and published quarterly. As of the first quarter of 1996, the NCREIF index tracks
over 1900 properties with an unlevered value of approximately $30 billion. The assets are owned
primarily by pension funds.
While acknowledging that the NCREIF index is less than perfect, researchers have linked public
and private returns with varying degrees of success. Gyourko and Kiem conclude that lagged
values of a REIT portfolio can predict the returns generated by NCREIF.35 Giliberto [1990]
demonstrates that the returns from equity REITs and the NCREIF index have some similar, though
unspecified, real estate factors.36 It should be noted that both of these authors performed some
statistical measures to the return series prior to realizing their findings.
Other complications in comparing the returns from publicly held companies and private real estate
returns represented by indices such as the NCREIF are:
1. The public market companies may include debt whereas the indexed properties are
typically unlevered.
2. The publicly traded companies probably include stock market risk factors in addition
to real estate factors.
3. The property companies may carry on development projects, the value of which is
reflected on their balance sheets at cost. Shares will therefore reflect an option value
to development. The value of the properties in the index, however, will not carry the
same value as the option has already been exercised prior to inclusion in the index.37
35 Gyourko and Kiem, pg. 459.
36 Giliberto, 1990, pg. 262.
37 Henry and Ward, pg. 208.
Further work performed by Geltner, Rodriguez and O'Connor solidified the link between the
public and private markets while addressing many of the concerns outlined above. In order to
address stock market noise, while also allowing that many real estate investors have a long
investment horizon, they used a holding period of return of five years. They then applied an "un-
smoothing" technique to the NCREIF and compared it to the un-levered NAREIT index. They
conclude that the indices move in the same general direction with the informational superior
NAREIT index leading the NCREIF. Further, they state that their results are "broadly consistent
with the hypothesis that public and private real estate are the same thing". 38
In the United Kingdom property companies (the U.K. equivalent of REITs) do not have a tax
advantage over other businesses. The main business focus of the property companies are similar
to REITs in that they acquire and manage property.39 Barkham and Geltner perform a similar
analysis as Geltner et al. in unsmoothing the Jones Lang Wooten (JLW) index for the UK.40 As of
1995, the JLW included approximately 200 properties valued at E500 million. The authors
recognize that this is a small sample, but point out that the statistical characteristics of the index
are highly correlated with other indices.41 They then compared the "un-smoothed" JLW to the
unlevered FTA Property Index.
In analyzing annual returns, Barkham and Geltner [1995] conclude that, unlike the U.S. market,
the public market in the U.K. does not lead the private market. They postulate the reasons for this
are that, unlike a comparison between the U.S. REIT market and NCREIF, the property types in
the FTA Property Index and the property companies themselves are of the same type and are
geographically concentrated. Further, a larger share of properties has been securitized in the U.K.
than the U.S. 42
Interestingly, the property companies in the U.K. traditionally trade at a discount to net asset value
(NAV), the reasons for which are not clearly understood. 43 Further study by Barkham and Ward
explore various company specific reasons (e.g. unrealized taxes, quality of management, liquidity
38 Henry and Ward, 1995.
39 Barkham, 1995, pg. 91.
44 Barkham and Geltner, pg. 22.
41 Ibid. pg. 23.
42 Barkham and Geltner, pg. 42.
43 Barkham, 1995, pg. 92.
etc.) and "noise traders" who miss-price the underlying assets. They conclude that, while all of the
above have some relation to the observed variation, the studied factors do not fully explain the
discount.44
In conclusion, researchers have confirmed a reasonably intuitive issue; the returns generated by
privately held real estate and those generated by publicly traded companies whose business is
primarily owning and managing real estate, are linked and move in essentially the same manner.
While not necessarily intuitive, it has also been shown that the public and private markets in the
United Kingdom are more or less contemporaneous, whereas they are not in the U.S., implying
that the private market in the U.K. is quicker to impound information than its U.S. counterpart.
A further conclusion is that the properties represented by the analyzed public and private markets
in the U.K. are probably more homogenous than in the U.S. This should bode well for our study,
as in addition to studying the U.K. market as a whole, we will be further segregating it by sector.
Should our research technique be applied to the U.S. market, some adjustments may be needed to
the property groupings, within both the public and .private indices, in order to make them more
homogenous.
2.4 Hedging: A Review
Hedging is a technique to offset particular sources of risk as opposed to searching for the optimal
risk-return profile for an entire portfolio.4 5 Often times, hedging strategies are employed by
companies to negate risks that are not associated with their core business, but are inherent in
performing their business on a day to day basis. For example, the profitability of a manufacturer
that exports products may be affected by currency exchange rate risks in addition to the risks
intrinsic within the manufacturing business. If properly hedged, the currency risks can be
managed, thereby allowing the company to focus on its core competency.
Alternatively, hedging can be used to lock in anticipated profits or costs. It is not uncommon in
the agricultural business to enter into futures contracts to control income/expenditures many
months hence. That is, a farmer who has contracted to deliver grain in six months may enter into
44 Barkham and Ward, 1996.
45 Bodie, Kane and Marcus, pg. 833.
the short (opposite to that of holding the asset) position of a six month future contract. As the
price moves either up or down over the next six months, the profit or loss of the long position
(requirement to deliver the grain) will be offset by the short position in the futures contract. The
farmer will not be subject to the vagaries of the spot market in six months, but will have hedged
his position and predetermined his profit. This technique is known as a short hedge, that is, one in
which the party already owns the asset and expects to sell it at a future date. The opposite scenario
would be a long hedge in which the party expects to purchase the asset at some future date.46
There is a distinct possibility that the hedge will not be completely effective. This is typically due
to one or more of the following reasons:
1. The assets being hedged and the assets underlying the hedge may not be identical.
2. The exact transaction dates may not be known.
3. The hedge may need to be closed out before its natural expiration.
These items lead to basis risk, which is defined as the difference between the spot price of the
asset and the value of the hedge. If the assets are exactly the same while item 2 is known and item
3 is not necessary, then the basis risk should be zero. The assets are rarely identical however, even
in the case of commodities as storage and delivery costs must be addressed. This implies that
most hedging is actually cross-hedging, meaning that the underlying assets are not identical. 47
When a cross hedging technique is employed, it is unlikely that unexpected changes in the hedge
and the asset will be identical.48 That is, a 1% change in the asset may not relate to a 1% change
in the value of the hedge.
This leads to the definition of the hedge ratio as the ratio of the size of the position in the hedge to
the size of the exposure to the underlying asset.49 The optimal hedge ratio, h*, is the ratio which
minimizes the variance of the hedge portfolio profit per unit of the asset. Referring to Stoll and
Whaley [pg. 54] for the derivation it can be shown that:
2h* = -aahGh 
_
46 Hull, pg. 84.
47 Bodie, Kane and Marcus, pg. 842.
48 Stoll and Whaley, pg. 52.
49 Hull, pg. 95.
where aah is the covariance of the asset price with the hedge and ah2 is the variance of hedge. The
ratio of the covariance to the variance is also the definition of an assets' beta (P). In a single
variable ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, the opposite of h* is the slope coefficient.
Further, in a multiple regression the estimated coefficients are the respective hedge ratios for each
variable while the intercept term represents the basis risk.
As for evaluating the effectiveness of the hedge, p 2, it is defined by Stoll and Whaley [pg. 56] as
P2 =IY 2 /a2p2 1-ca /aa
where c2 is the variance of the residual term. The effectiveness is also the definition of the
adjusted R-squared term in an OLS regression.
An important consideration in constructing a hedge is the time interval over which the change in
values should be measured. Conventional wisdom would lead one to consider the shortest time
frame that data is readily available. This technique, however, could lead to issues with the error
term of an OLS regression. That is, the error term should be governed by the following
constraints: E(t) = 0, E(t2 ) = a2 and E(st st-1) = 0. With a shorter time interval, the observations
become more random which leads to increased variability and less reliable regression results.50
The impact of differing time intervals can be evaluated by analyzing the standard error and
confidence interval results from standard OLS regressions. A lower standard error term and
narrower confidence interval leads to more robust results. Lastly, as the time interval between
observations increases, the intercept term representing the basis risk, will also increase. Therefore,
the impact of the time interval of the observations must be carefully evaluated with regard to its
impact on the error terms, confidence interval, basis risk and overall results.
2.5 The Methodology of Hedging Real Estate
As noted above, there appears to be a link between the returns generated by privately held real
estate and the public markets (see Chapter 2.3). One of the implications of this relationship is that
it may be possible to hedge real estate risk in the public marketplace. This section explores some
5 Stoll and Whaley, pg. 58.
of the previous research done in this area. The next section will discuss the results of several
market instruments that have been introduced which attempted to create a real estate hedge.
Researchers have taken various approaches to the task of creating a viable real estate hedge. Most
seem to agree with Giliberto [1993], however, in that a market driven hedge should be utilized in
order to avoid the effects of an appraisal based index (e.g. the RNI).51 Such a hedge would allow
for a better application of modern portfolio theory, for asset allocation purposes, by having a
comparable measurement of volatility and covariance with other asset classes. That is, many of
the asset classes that real estate competes with for allocation of capital, are valued and traded daily
in the stock and bond markets, whereas traditionally real estate is not.
Furthering his earlier work of 1990, Giliberto's technique was to create a hedge based upon the
National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT) Equity Index. Realizing that
REITs were stocks and included a significant amount of stock market risk, he created a hedge
which included a short position in the S&P 500, in order to remove the stock market's systematic
risk. Also realizing that the correlation and volatility between REITs and the S&P 500 may move
over time, he allowed the hedge ratio to vary on a monthly basis. Creating the hedge in this
manner significantly reduced the stock market effect while still retaining real estate risk.52 He
then compared the results with the reported (i.e. smoothed) RNI, reporting a correlation of .18. He
identified the smoothing affects of the appraisal based RNI as a possible culprit of the low
correlation.
Kerson [1994] built upon this concept, when he created a "Market-hedged Real Estate Index"
(MaREI) hedge in a comparable manner. There were, however some differences. First, rather
than using the NAREIT index, he used the Wilshire Real Estate Securities Index (WRE). He also
realized that REITs were more strongly correlated with small capitalized stocks than with large
capitalized stocks. Therefore, rather than use the S&P 500, he utilized the Russell 2000, which
includes firms with capitalization's of $60 million to $590 million with an average of $205
million.53 While the returns of his dynamic hedge exhibit a relatively low volatility, the trade off
51 Giliberto 1993, pg. 97.
5 Ibid. pg. 96.
5 Kerson, 1994, pg. 2.
is a high volatility of the hedge ratio, which as he points out, will raise the implicit costs due to
transaction costs associated with rebalancing the hedge.54
Riddiough [1995] extended these previous approaches further as an student exercise for his "Real
Estate Capital Markets" class at MIT's Center for Real Estate. First, the RNI was "unsmoothed"
in an attempt to determine the "true" underlying returns. Second, the U.S. market was divided into
geographic regions to address the importance of the regional impact of economic drivers. Several
teams of Riddiough's MIT/CRE students used an approach similar to Kerson in compiling their
hedge. One team used a basket of REITs that were based in the region being studied (in lieu of an
overall index as used by Kerson), along with a short position in the Wilshire 4500, reporting an R-
square of .61 on a static five year period. Riddiough concludes that the process of creating a
hedge may be further enhanced by refining the geographic and property type selection technique
coupled with a more sophisticated econometric approach towards compilation of the hedge.55
As for the impact of the above on our thesis, as was shown in Chapter 2.2, the returns from
commercial real estate in the U.K. exhibit a stronger link to property sector as compared with
either geographic or "economic driver" location. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the IPD
index will be unsmoothed to remove the affects of appraiser uncertainty and the inherent lagging
of the index. The process of selecting the hedge components will also be presented.
2.6 The History of Hedging Real Estate
Measuring returns on an ongoing basis for privately held real estate has proven to be challenging
as was discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2.1 of this paper. Even allowing for the difficulties in
measuring returns, numerous researchers have demonstrated that real estate should be included in
a well diversified investment portfolio. There are, however, several practical problems associated
with implementing a strategy of direct investment in commercial real estate:s5
1. The lumpiness, magnitude of transaction costs and management costs of direct
investment limits participation to those with sufficient wealth.
2. The liquidity of real estate is often inverse as to when its needed. That is, when the
demand for liquidity is high is often when its availability is quite low.
54 Kerson, 1994.
5 Riddiough, 1995, pg. 94.
56 Riddiough, pg. 88.
3. Lack of tradable instruments precludes owners from diversifying away exposure in an
efficient manner.57
If a reasonable and liquid hedge were found for commercial real estate, investors could gain
exposure to the property markets without actually purchasing real estate. Further, owners could
selectively manage their property risks by creating synthetic options. Some optimistic authors
went as far as to state:
"The economic significance of index-based real estate derivative markets, if they were to
become well established, could well be much greater than that of all financial derivative
markets established to date combined."5 8
While the market appears ripe for hedging instruments, several previous attempts in both the U.S.
and the U.K. have either failed outright or met with lukewarm response by market participants.
In the United States for example, the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) began trading
index options on a price weighted REIT index comprised of 25 REITs (the RIX Index) in February
1995. The intent was to provide investors with a daily traded mechanism to hedge real estate risk.
When the index was assembled, most of the largest (as measured by market capitalization) REITs
were included. Through the end of 1995 however, the trading volume was very light (refer to
Appendix I). Since the index is comprised of a diverse pool of REITs including representation
from the office, self-storage and health care sectors, it would be difficult for an investor to hedge
or replicate any particular sector or geographic region using this particular investment tool.
An alternative to hedging in the public markets was taken by Aldrich, Eastman and Waltch
(AEW), a pension fund advisor, and Morgan Stanley 1993. A client of AEW's needed to offset a
specific real estate risk, but did not wish to actually sell the assets at that time as a substantial loss
would have been incurred. AEW and Morgan Stanley arranged a swap exchanging the returns
generated by the Russell NCREIF Index (RNI) with the LIBOR less about 50 basis points. The
swap was unusual in that the RNI has certain "self-predictive" powers, is appraisal based and is
published only quarterly (refer to Chapter 2.1 for additional discussion). The above
notwithstanding, both parties are reportedly satisfied with the swap two years later. According to
one of the original advisors, however, no additional swaps have been arranged.
5 Kerson, pg. 1.
58 Case, Schiller, and Weiss, pg. 91
Bankers Trust (1994)59 and Salomon Brothers (1993)60 also tried an innovative approach to
formulating a hedge for real estate risk. They created their own indices built out of exchange-
traded REITs, REOCs and small-cap stocks. While they take somewhat different tacks, they both
consider that the public markets may be a better indicator of the value of real estate than the RNI.
The Bankers Trust approach, in particular, appears to be an attempt to generate interest and
business in their "Market-hedged Real Estate Index" (MaREI) as a tradable investment tool. They
viewed the MaREI as perhaps being a better way "to capture a pure play on commercial real estate
than (does) the RNI .... 61 According to a representative of Bankers Trust, the index has not been
successful in the marketplace.
In the U.K., The London Futures and Options Exchange (FOX) introduced four property futures
contracts in May 1991. They were:62
1. A residential property contract based on the NAHP index.
2. A mortgage interest rate (MIR) contract.
3. A commercial property capital values contract based on the Investment Property
Databank (IPD) commercial capital value index.
4. A commercial property rents contract based on the IPD commercial rent index.
Unfortunately, the contracts did not reach an economically viable level of trading volume and
were removed from the market in October 1991, amid charges that the prices and trading volume
were being artificially maintained.
More recently in the U.K., Property Income Certificates were issued by BZM Investment
Management Ltd. in 1994. The returns from these securities were tied to the IPD property index.
Structurally, the securities were configured in a manner similar to a closed end fund. However,
BZM erred when it announced that additional securities of the same class would be issued at a
future date. The investors were not pleased, and the subsequent issuance fared poorly.63
59 Kerson, 1994.
60 Giliberto, 1993.
61 Kerson, pg. 8.
62 Patel, pg. 343.
63 Henry and Ward, pg. 207.
The above attempts at creating market instruments that would facilitate the hedging of real estate
risk highlight some of the difficulties in both the public and private markets. Traditionally, real
estate is neither traded nor valued frequently, as compared with the publicly traded debt (bond) or
equity (stock) markets. When firms have created "new" indices to value real estate in the publicly
traded markets investors have been reluctant to participate. This is probably due to a combination
of how the indices were compiled, a certain skepticism that the new indices in fact represented real
estate, an inability on the part of the investor to address specific risks, and the realization that the
index sponsors may simply be creating tools to generate business for themselves.
As for private attempts to hedge, we are only aware of one (the AEW/Morgan Stanley swap).
While this approach may be successful on a limited, case specific basis, finding willing
counterparties to assume specific real estate risk will remain a difficult obstacle.
2.7 Implications and Innovations
The development of a successful hedge for real estate returns must be based on a widely accepted
and understood methodology for measuring those returns. If an appraisal based index, such as the
RNI or the IPD is to be used, it must be adjusted to account for its inherent problems. Moreover,
the index should be disaggregated to allow investors to address specific investment risks.
The components of the hedge should be widely traded and valued by the market on a daily basis.
This would assure that the market efficiently impounds information into the hedge's value and
would aid in maintaining its liquidity. In addition, the hedging instrument should allow individual
investors the flexibility necessary to meet the specific requirements of their investments. Unless a
hedging instrument is flexible enough to meet the specific needs of individual investors and is
fully understood and accepted by the marketplace, investors will be reluctant to utilize it and it
will suffer from thin trading volume. By utilizing only currently available publicly traded
securities, many of these problems that have plagued other approaches would be avoided.
Our approach will utilize only existing financial instruments and thereby avoid the problems
associated with the creation of new instruments and having to convince the marketplace of their
viability. This was the problem that faced the FOX and that is currently facing the CBOE. In
addition, because investors require hedges that are relatively specific to their investment risks, it
will be difficult for these types of index exchanges to ever fully satisfy the criteria necessary to
meet investors' needs.
The use of publicly traded equities overcomes the problem of liquidity by the very nature of
utilizing only the currently existing public markets, where trading volume is high and prices are, at
a minimum, priced to market daily. Furthermore, it would allow the development of specific
hedges for specific real estate investment risks. No matter how unique the required hedge may be,
since the only "counterparty" necessary to implement it will be the public equity market, this
would not presumably present a problem.
Another innovation of our approach will be to utilize the spatial requirements of a company and
not its capitalized value, to determine the proper weightings within the hedge. This was done in
order to directly relate the use of real estate to the impact a company may have on the real estate
market. In the past, most similar studies have utilized the capitalized value of a company as a
proxy for the company's size and impact upon the real estate market, even though there is no
apparent direct correlation between the two. In our study, employment data was used to rank the
largest end users of real estate in the U.K. market and the returns for these companies were then
used in establishing the hedge. This methodology allows each company an equal weighting,
initially, which is subsequently adjusted through the regression process described in the next
chapter.
Chapter 3: Development of a Static Replicating Hedge
As indicated previously, this thesis involves a two stage process through which we will attempt to
first replicate real estate returns using publicly traded securities and second, to apply the hedge for
estimating future real estate returns. This Chapter will discuss the methodology followed to
establish a static or replicating proxy for real estate returns. Chapter 4 will discuss the
development of the predictive hedge.
3.1 Methodology
Before the development of any type of hedging instrument can be addressed, it must first be
established that real estate returns can, in fact, be reasonably replicated utilizing only publicly
traded equities. In order to establish this, we sought to develop a proxy of carefully selected,
publicly traded equities that demonstrated a significant correlation with the U.K. real estate
market's "true returns." This replicating proxy will be developed, ex post, utilizing historical real
estate and stock market monthly return data, over a five year period of time.
The development of the replicating or static proxy for the U.K.'s real estate returns involved a
three step process as follows:
1. Unsmoothing the IPD Index to establish the "true returns" of the underlying real estate asset.
2. Choosing the equities that would be used to establish the return proxy.
3. Performing regression analysis to test the proxy's correlation with the unsmoothed IPD return
indices and to determine the proper weighting for each of the individual equities within the
proxy.
3.2 Unsmoothing the IPD Index:
Fundamentally, appraisal smoothing results from the manner in which appraisers arrive at their
individual property valuations. Because actual transactions in property investments are relatively
infrequent, appraisals must rely on estimates of market value based upon sales of comparable
properties. However,
"...because they have incomplete current information, valuers may be influenced
by past valuations of the subject property or by past transaction prices of
comparable properties...(resulting) in the contemporaneous valuation containing
components of the past market values mixed with the true contemporaneous
market value, which induces a lagging and smoothing within the aggregate
index." 64
The U.K. real estate market has a variety of property indices that are constructed for the purpose of
establishing returns for annual, quarterly and monthly periods, as well as on a sector and regional
basis. The Investment Property Databank (IPD) Monthly Index was utilized for this thesis because
it contains detailed monthly return data and is disaggregated into three industry categories. In
establishing a useful dynamic hedge for property returns (as will be discussed in Chapter 4), we
felt that the shorter monthly return series would allow investors the ability to adjust their hedges
more frequently and would therefore be more viable. In addition, since the index is disaggregated
into three sectors (industrial, office and retail), we were able to look at each sector as an
independent return series, which could allow investors to establish more specific property hedges.
64 Barkham and Geltner, 1994
As discussed earlier, the U.K. market is relatively geographically homogenous and we did not
analyze the data on a geographical basis.
For the purpose of this thesis, we analyzed only the capital appreciation component of the index,
because as noted earlier, this aspect captures the majority of the index's volatility. The IPD
measures capital appreciation as the increase in the value of the properties, net of any capital
expenditure, expressed as a percentage of the capital employed during the month:
E i(CVit - CVi(t.) - Cit) * 100% = IPD monthly return
Y i(CVitt + Cit)
Where CVit is the capital value of property i at the end of the month t, and Cit is the cost of all
capital expenditure on property i in calendar month t, less any capital receipts.
The IPD Monthly Index is unique, in that each individual property is appraised monthly by one of
seventeen independent surveying firms.65 The frequency of the monthly appraisal and the fact that
the majority of the contributing funds are valued at the end of each calendar month, should reduce
the influence of temporal aggregation that is evident with indices that rely on annual or even
quarterly external appraisals.
Although the reported monthly returns (see Exhibit 3.1 below) from the IPD are relatively volatile
(as compared to the RNI), it is apparent from Exhibit 3.2 that the IPD Monthly Indices are
relatively smooth over time. This is to be expected due to the fact that the indices are valuation
65 The IPD Monthly Index consists of the property portfolios held by property Unit Trusts, Unit Linked
Insurance Funds and Managed Pension Funds which are valued monthly. All commercial properties held in
the U.K. and Ireland by these funds are covered, except those that are purely residential or agricultural.
Hotels, leisure facilities, medical premises, car parks and development sites are also excluded.
IPD has adopted certain conventions in the construction of the IPD Monthly Index. The majority of the
contributing funds are valued at the end of each calendar month. It is therefore assumed that all valuations
are at this date. This is also the case for all income and expenditure data. Monthly capital expenditure and
capital receipts are included, but revenue expenditure (except management costs for rent collection) are
excluded from the calculations. Actual transaction and management costs are either supplied by the funds
or, when not available, are estimated by applying standard percentages.
Income calculations use net income, which is gross rent receivable less any management cost (rent collection
fee) and ground rent. In the case of rent reviews on reversionary properties, the estimated rental value is
entered at the time of the review and held constant until the review is settled, when the new rent is entered
without any retrospective modification. For over rented properties, the existing rent is held constant.
The Index is based upon the performance of standing investments only. New acquisitions and development
properties are only included two valuation months after their purchase date or, in the case of developments,
the date of practical completion. Source: Investment Property Databank Ltd.
based and are therefore subject to the smoothing behavior as described above. As noted, the
tendency for appraisers is to rely on the previous period's valuation as a benchmark for the current
period's valuation due to the lack of contemporaneous transactions. Therefore, it was necessary to
unsmooth the return index in order to remove this backward looking bias and to better reflect the
true volatility of the returns. 66
Exhibit 3.1: IPD Monthly Reported Returns
66 Note that direct comparisons between this paper and other research (e.g. Barkham and Geltner, 1995) need
to be made carefully as we are analyzing monthly data whereas typically others have used quarterly or
annual data.
Exhibit 3.2: IIPD Monthly Reported Indices
Utilizing the methodology described by Fisher, Geltner and Webb we unsmoothed the monthly
capital appreciation return data from the IPD for the three sectors, as well as for the All Property
index. This was done for the period of January 1987 through April 1996. In order to apply Fisher,
et. al.'s methodology, the first step was to determine the most appropriate lag periods, based upon
statistical analysis and what is observed about appraisal behavior. As a first step diagnostic we
analyzed the correlogram for each of the return series. The correlogram indicates the relative
magnitude of the return series' partial autocorrelation. Upon review, it appeared that the majority
of the autocorrelation tendencies of the returns could be explained by lagging the index up to three
months. Appendix II compares the results for the reported returns and the returns for each series
with 1 and 3 month lags.
This was then confirmed by performing an analysis of eight consecutive monthly lags. In order to
determine the proper model, we compared the R-squared values for each combination containing
variables with significant t-statistics. Because the regression contained lagged time-series
variables, the standard Durbin-Watson test is no longer viable.68 A superior test for
autocorrelation in series containing lagged variables is the Ljung-Box Q-statistic. Additionally,
67 Fisher, Geltner and Webb, 1994.
68 Pindyke and Rubinfeld, pg. 147.
when comparing the various models we utilized both the Akaike Information Criterion and the
Schwartz-Bayesian Criterion to determine the best fit model. These criterion essentially filter out
the effects of extraneous terms that may appear in the regression equation. Based on the results, it
was determined that the "true returns" would be best represented by lagging the index returns by
one and three month periods. Refer to Appendix III for a summary of these results. Exhibit 3.3
below shows the results for the Industrial Sector.
LS // Dependent Variable is IND
Sample(adjusted): 1987:04 1996:04
Included observations: 109 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
IND(-1) 0.767849 0.078674 9.759838 0
IND(-3) 0.154619 0.078769 1.962951 0.0523
C 0.000194 0.000526 0.368514 0.7132
R-squared 0.812081 Mean dependent var 0.003316
Adjusted R-squared 0.808535 S.D. dependent var 0.012038
S.E. of regression 0.005268 Akaike info criterion -10.46521
Sum squared resid 0.002941 Schwarz criterion -10.39114
Log likelihood 418.6899 F-statistic 229.0359
Durbin-Watson stat 2.10769 Prob(F-statistic) 0
Exhibit 3.3: Regression Results for Industrial Sector (1 & 3 Month Lags)
[A structural note on the balance of this thesis: Results for the Industrial Sector will be used for
exhibit purposes within the body of the text. Results for the Retail, Office and All Property
Sectors will be included in the Appendix. The Industrial Sector results are representative of the
other sectors.]
As noted above, due to requirements of the types of funds in the IPD Monthly Index, all properties
are reappraised on a monthly basis. In addition, anecdotal evidence indicates that a more thorough
appraisal of the same properties is performed on a quarterly basis. These two appraisal artifacts
would support the statistical results reported above. The tendency for appraisers to rely on the
previous period's valuation would cause the index's reported returns to lag the underlying property
values, by approximately one month and three months. Lagging the index by these two time
periods effectively removed these effects from the returns. Exhibit 3.4 below is a graphical
representation of the Industrial Sector regression. See Appendix IV for complete results.
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Exhibit 3.4: Industrial Sector (1 & 3 Month Lags)
In order for the returns to reflect the true volatility of the underlying asset, an assumption needed
to be made relating the volatility of real estate returns to those found in the stock market. For the
purposes of this analysis, we have assumed a stock market volatility of 20% per year, with
property price volatility being 75% of this amount. The accuracy of these assumptions are not
critical to the methodology we use to formulate the hedge, as these volatility figures do not
directly impact the fundamental economic relationships being tested. However, changing the
volatility assumptions would affect the weightings of the individual securities within the hedge.
See Chapter 5.3 for a further discussion. Next, the "true" unsmoothed returns were calculated
utilizing the methodology described by Fisher, et. al. Refer to Appendix V for the results of these
calculations. Finally, the unsmoothed returns were used to compile unsmoothed return indices for
each sector. Exhibit 3.5 below, shows the resulting unsmoothed return index graphed against the
reported IPD monthly return index for the Industrial Sector. Please see Appendix VI for complete
results.
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Exhibit 3.5: Industrial Sector Unsmoothed Returns vs. Reported Returns
3.3 Selection Criteria for the Publicly Traded Equities
The next step involved the selection of a representative set of equities that might exhibit an
economic relationship to the underlying property values. In order to identify public companies
that would have the most significant impact on this relationship, we selected between 60 and 70 of
the largest companies for each of the three sectors, based on the number of employees. This
produced a total "universe" of approximately 200 equities, which, if our hypothesis was valid,
should exhibit a significant correlation of returns with the unsmoothed IPD.
The universe was expanded to include returns for several government bonds to test for
relationships between interest rate movements and real estate returns. Earlier efforts in creating a
real estate hedge in the U.S. [e.g. Riddiough 1995, Kerson 1994 et al.], included a small basket of
securities and an index of a broader portfolio of stocks. The rational for the inclusion of an index,
which in these examples was shorted in the creation of the hedge, was to eliminate stock market
risk leaving behind only real estate exposure. To test this reasoning, we included the FTSE 100
and the FTA Property indices. Finally, we included a number of Real Estate Operating Companies
(REOC's). Since the primary assets of a REOC are real estate, returns generated by the REOC are
likely to be linked to the assets generated by those returns.
Price data was then collected and converted into monthly returns for all of the above securities for
the ten year period of June 1986 through June 1996. Due to a lack of complete return data for a
number of these entities, the data was then culled to result in a total universe of approximately 240
securities. Although this represents only a small percentage of the total number of publicly traded
financial instruments in the U.K., we felt that it was representative of the type of entities that
should have real estate based relationships. While the inclusion of more companies, (or for that
matter, all publicly traded companies), may have increased the probability of discovering higher
correlations, we felt that this would also increase the likelihood of spurious associations having
nothing to do with any underlying real estate based relationships.
3.4 Stock and Time Period Selection
Once a universe of equities, bonds and indices had been assembled, the next step was to determine
how many securities would be in the final hedge and over what time period the replicative hedge
would be compiled. Our goal in developing the "best" replicating hedge was to include as few
securities as possible while maintaining a significantly high correlation between the two return
series, as measured by the regression's R-square value. In addition, we did not want to include
any variables that exhibited less than a 95% significance as measured by their individual t-stats.
Because there is a tradeoff between the number of variables and the significance level of the
replication, a decision had to be made regarding the maximum number of variables (and hence the
hedge's transaction costs) and the minimum acceptable efficacy of the hedge. Since including a
large number of variables could introduce prohibitively high transaction costs in establishing and
maintaining a dynamic hedge, we limited the maximum number of variables to 15 publicly traded
securities. At this level we were still able to achieve significant R-squares in the range of mid
.80's to low .90's for the different sectors. Reducing the number of variables further, lowered the
significance of the replication, while adding more variables improved the results on a marginally
diminishing basis.69
The next step was to select the length of time over which the static hedge would be compiled. Due
to the relatively large number of securities in the regression, we were concerned about degrees of
69 For example, using 8 securities to replicate the industrial sector produced an R-square of .65 over 60
months. Interestingly, in previous research on the RNI Industrial/R&D Sector, we were able to replicate the
return index to 98% accuracy, over a 5-year period (with quarterly increments), using only 9 exchange
traded equities.
freedom, if the number of observations were too low. In order to avoid this problem we
determined that a time frame of 60 months would be most appropriate.7 0
The time period selected for the creation of the static hedge was limited by the availability of
computerized return series for the assembled universe of securities. Unfortunately, prior to
approximately 1990, return data was no longer available for a number of the securities chosen for
our research. Because of this limitation, we selected 1990 as the first year of the hedge. Using 60
months as the length of the static hedge brought us to December 1994. This allowed us to test the
predictive ability of the hedge over a 14 month period, from January 1995 to February 1996.
3.5 The Creation of a Static Replicative Hedge
Using a combination of regression techniques, the selected universe of publicly traded securities
was culled to 15 securities for each of the three real estate return sectors as well as the overall
property index. We expected that the hedge would include a number of companies that were
explicitly related to a particular sector. We were, however, anticipating some cross over of
companies into other sectors, due to the homogeneity of the U.K. economy and property market.
That is, as the U.K. is essentially a single economy, each of the sectors should be related on a
fundamental economic basis. This relationship is evident by analyzing the cross-correlation of the
unsmoothed real estate return series depicted below:
Industrial Office Retail All Property
Industrial 1 - - -
Office 0.609 1 - -
Retail 0.583 0.576 1 -
All Property 0.755 0.903 0.844 1
Exhibit 3.6: Cross-Correlation of Unsmoothed Sector Returns
As shown, the industrial, office and all property indices exhibit fairly strong correlation. The retail
sector exhibits weaker, though still strong positive correlation with both the retail and office
sectors, and very strong positive correlation with the all property index.
7 We also experimented with the time period, trying both 48 and 72 month periods as well. As would be
expected, the 48 month period moderately improved the results while the 72 month period resulted in a
moderate degradation of the results.
The regression results and the fifteen selected securities for the industrial sector are presented
below in Exhibit 3.7:
Multiple R .93908
R Square .88187
Adjusted R Square .84160
Standard Error .01577
Company Name
Compass Group
Dalgety, PLC
Dawson International
Johnson Group
Rank Organisation
Salvesen Christian
Sedgwick Group
Smith & Nephew
Tesco. PLC
Wolseley, PLC
Zeneca Group
Berisford, PLC
Provident Financial
Daejan Holdings
Town Centre Securities
Constant
Beta Coefficient
0.265169
0.232024
-0.19808
0.253835
-0.276595
-0.130593
0.174113
-0.104951
-0.253987
0.161705
0.36809
0.086916
-0.204466
0.193277
-0.114242
-0.002379
t-stat
-5.807
-4.424
-6.251
-4.986
-5.46
-2.913
-6.25
-2.118
-5.72
-3.908
-4.749
-6.688
-4.297
-3.165
-2.726
-0.988
Primary Business Activity
Industrial Catering contractor
Food manufacturer and Dist.
Textile Manufacturer
Dry Cleaner and Linen Rental
Holding Company / Manufacturer
Food and Brick Manufacturer
Insurance broker / Property Manager
Pharmaceutical manufacturer
Food Proprietors
Sanitaryware manufacturing
Manufact. of Pharm. and Agriculture
Prop. dev., Food and Agribusiness
Holding company
Property company
Property company
Exhibit 3.7: Regression Results for Industrial Sector
In analyzing the securities selected, it is evident that the majority are either companies from the
industrial/manufacturing sector and/or property companies. Considering the strong cross
correlation between the sectors' returns as seen in Exhibit 3.6, this would appear to support our
original hypothesis concerning the relationships between the end users and real estate values. Not
unexpectedly, several property companies are included which implies that REOCs do exhibit a
correlation with the property index. As for the coefficients, note that about half are negative. This
means that in establishing the hedge, the mechanics of which will be discussed in Section 3.6,
these securities would need to be shorted. More fundamentally, this means that the fortunes of
these companies as reflected by their stock prices, are moving opposite that of the underlying real
estate. For instance, financial markets often reward companies by bidding up its stock price for
downsizing its work force. This would reduce the company's requirements for space and hence
apply downward pressure on associated real estate values, at the same time its stock price is on the
rise.
The regression results for both the reported and calculated monthly return series and their
associated indices are shown graphically in Exhibits 3.8 and 3.9 for the industrial sector. In
analyzing the results it is apparent that in most instances the monthly returns for the unsmoothed
IPD and the replicating hedge correspond in both the direction and the magnitude of their
movements. Referring to the indices, the same observation can be made, as well as the fact that
after approximately four years the index values are effectively equal and remain so for the
remainder of the test period. These results indicate that our methodology for creating the
replicating hedge was successful. Refer to Appendices VII - IX for the office, retail and all
property sectors, the results for which are not appreciably different from those presented below.
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Exhibit 3.9: Industrial Replicating Hedge Index vs. Unsmoothed IPD Industrial Index
3.6 How the Hedge Would be Purchased
After determining these coefficients, the next step in the process was to convert them into a
specific number of shares for each of the securities. The output from the regressions (the
coefficients) represent the hedge ratios of each term in the regression. Recall that each dependent
variable is the return generated by a particular security over a monthly interval.
Since all of the independent variables have a similar unit of measure (i.e. percent return) and are
economically similar (i.e. a share of a security), the coefficients can be directly compared to one
another. Each coefficient therefore represents a weighting of the returns generated by its
independent variable as compared with the others within the hedge. Keeping in mind that the
hedge is return based, each of the coefficients must be multiplied by the amount to be hedged.
The resulting product is the value required to be purchased in each security. Dividing this value
by the initial security price results in the number of shares of each stock in which a position must
be taken. Generally, the formula to determine the number of shares of a particular security would
be:
(security hedge ratio * amount to be hedged) / initial security price = number of shares
Again, using the industrial sector as an example:
Security
Company Name
Compass Group
Dalgety, PLC
Dawson International
Johnson Group
Rank Organisation
Salvesen Christian
Sedgwick Group
Smith & Nephew
Tesco. PLC
Wolseley, PLC
Zeneca Group
Berisford, PLC
Provident Financial
Daejan Holdings
Town Centre Securities
Hedge Ratio
(Coefficient)
0.2652
0.2320
-0.1981
0.2538
-0.2766
-0.1306
0.1741
-0.1050
-0.2540
0.1617
0.3681
0.0869
-0.2045
0.1933
-0.1142
Pounds per
Security*
2,651,690
2,320,240
(1,980,800)
2,538,350
(2,765,950)
(1,305,930)
1,741,130
(1,049,510)
(2,539,870)
1,617,050
3,680,900
869,160
(2,044,660)
1,932,770
(1,142,420)
Total 4,522,150
Price as of Number of
Jan-95
3.150
3.879
1.225
2.300
3.690
2.670
1.550
1.530
2.490
3.915
8.790
2.280
2.735
11.950
0.990
Shares*
841,806
598,154
(1,616,980)
1,103,630
(749,580)
(489,112)
1,123,310
(685,954)
(1,020,028)
413,040
418,760
381,211
(747,590)
161,738
(1,153,960)
* Example is for a £10,000,000 hedge
Exhibit 3.10: Replicating Hedge Calculation
Of course, this is does not imply that the stocks themselves must actually be purchased.
Alternative methods such as futures and options could also be used to gain exposure while
reducing the up front costs. As for the constant term, it represents the basis risk of the hedge.
Notably, the t-statistic of this term is not significantly different from zero, so it can be ignored
without affecting the results. While the coefficients determined in the creation of the replicative
hedges can not be known prior to December 1994, these coefficients could be used to create a
static hedge as of January 1995.
3.7 Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter was to explore the potential for developing a static replicating hedge
for the various sectors of the capital appreciation component of the IPD Monthly Index. The first
step was to "unsmooth" the index to remove autocorrelation and to capture the "true" returns being
generated by the underlying asset. Based upon our analysis of the error terms of the unsmoothed
index, we believe that we were successful in removing the affects of autocorrelation from the
index.
The next step was to determine a basket of securities which replicated the true real estate returns
as measured by the unsmoothed index over a backward looking fixed period of time. This was
accomplished using data from January 1990 through December 1994. The innovation of our
technique was to let the coefficients of the regression determine the weightings of the securities in
the hedge. In similar attempts, others (e.g. Henry and Ward) had predetermined a weighting of the
securities before the regression was run. While 15 securities were ultimately selected for each
sector, note that in each case all of the securities form a statistically significant portion of the
composition of the replicating hedge (in excess of the 95% level of confidence).
The replicating hedge explains around 90% (depending upon the sector) of the variability of the
returns of the unsmoothed IPD Index. Referring back to Exhibit 3.8 and 3.9 it is important to
reiterate how well the replicated hedge returns and index correlate with the unsmoothed IPD.
These results indicate that it is indeed possible to replicate real estate returns using only publicly
traded securities.
As we are unaware of any statistical aberrations in either unsmoothing the index sectors or in
compiling the hedge itself, we believe that these results are quite strong. The implications of these
results will be discussed in Chapter 5.
Chapter 4: Development of a Predictive Hedge
4.1 Methodology
While the results determined above have strong implications for the investment community, they
are produced entirely ex post. That is, they were derived using historical data and therefore are not
predictive in nature. The intent of this chapter is to extend the methodology and "roll" it into the
future in order to predict the returns generated by the unsmoothed IPD Indices. If such a
predictive methodology can be developed it would enable investors to manage real estate risk by
giving them the ability to hedge future returns.
We analyzed several alternative methodologies for both the All Property and Industrial Sectors.
Once again the results for the Industrial Sector will be used for illustrative purposes in the body of
the test. The results for the All Property Sector are included in Appendices X - XIV. The
methodologies tested for each sector are as follow:
Extended static replicative hedge: This was the simplest hedge we analyzed. In this scenario, we
simply multiplied the coefficients of the static replicative hedge for the period of January 1990
through December 1994 by the monthly returns generated by those same stocks, for each month,
through February 1996. These results were then compared to the unsmoothed monthly real estate
returns. (See Appendices XI and XIII).
Rebalanced hedge: We next attempted to improve these results by rebalancing the coefficients of
the same 15 securities (on a monthly, quarterly and semiannual basis) based on a rolling
replicative hedge. (See Appendices XI and XIII). This rolling replicative hedge was determined
by regressing the returns for the previous 60 month period, for each new month being tested. For
example, in order to determine the value of the hedge for the month of February 1995, we
regressed the returns of the same 15 securities, which had been determined in the initial replicative
hedge, over the period of February 1990 through January 1995. These coefficients were then used
to calculate the hedge for February 1995. The process was then repeated for each subsequent
month. For March 1995 we regressed the period of March 1990 through February 1995, and so
forth, through February 1996. The rational for this approach was that better results would be
attained by keeping the static replicating hedge and the predictive hedge periods as
contemporaneous as possible. The shorter the lag between the two, the better chance the hedge
had of continuing the relationship that was evidenced in the previous 60 month period. It was also
felt that since only the ratio of the stocks held in the hedge would change from period to period
and not the stocks themselves, this restriction should have lower transaction costs then
reconfiguring the entire hedge (see below).
Reconfigured hedge: For this test, we again started with the same static replicative hedge
developed in Chapter 3 and then adjusted the coefficients in a similar manner to the rebalanced
hedge described above. However, in this instance we did not limit the securities to the same ones
as determined by the initial replicative hedge. That is, in each rebalancing period (which again
were monthly, quarterly and semiannual) we found the best fit regardless of the components of the
previous period's hedge. Ignoring transaction costs, we believed that this hedging strategy would
provide the best results. (See Appendices XII and XIV).
4.2 Results of the Predictive Hedges
In order to analyze the results of the hedges described above, we measured the monthly error terms
between the unsmoothed IPD returns and the returns from each predictive hedge. We were then
able to compare the results for each methodology across similar time periods. We were also able
to calculate and compare the average error terms and the standard deviations for each over the
entire test period of 14 months. The results are tabulated below in Exhibit 4.1:
Date
1/31/95
2/28/95
3/31/95
4/28/95
5/31/95
6/30/95
7/31/95
8/31/95
9/29/95
10/31/95
11/30/95
12/29/95
1/31/96
2/29/96
Replicative
Hedge
0.0379
-0.0353
-0.0137
0.0230
-0.0090
-0.0800
0.0596
0.0819
0.0089
-0.0137
-0.1348
-0.0088
-0.0093
-0.0392
Average -0.0095
St Deviation 0.0548
Rebalanced
Monthly
0.0379
-0.0336
-0.0116
0.0243
-0.0047
-0.0769
0.0632
0.0837
0.0158
-0.0222
-0.1112
-0.0226
0.0046
-0.0072
-0.0043
0.0509
Rebalanced
Ouarterly
0.0379
-0.0353
-0.0137
0.0244
-0.0043
-0.0847
0.0627
0.0787
0.0173
-0.0241
-0.1108
-0.0144
0.0036
-0.0110
-0.0053
0.0511
Rebalanced
Semiannully
0.0379
-0.0353
-0.0137
0.0230
-0.0090
-0.0800
0.0627
0.0787
0.0173
-0.0110
-0.1201
-0.0137
0.0036
-0.0110
-0.0051
0.0518
Reconfigured
Monthly
0.0379
-0.0334
-0.0103
-0.0007
-0.0404
-0.0601
0.0829
0.0232
-0.0179
0.0493
-0.1016
-0.0288
0.0932
0.0301
0.0017
0.0546
Reconfigured
Quarterly
0.0379
-0.0353
-0.0137
-0.0007
-0.0158
-0.0821
0.0829
-0.0305
-0.0129
0.0493
-0.0617
-0.0260
0.0932
0.0273
0.0009
0.0513
Reconfigured
Semiannually
0.0379
-0.0353
-0.0137
0.0230
-0.0090
-0.0800
0.0829
-0.0305
-0.0129
0.0264
-0.1187
0.0058
0.0932
0.0273
-0.0002
0.0569
Exhibit 4.1: Monthly Error Terms: Unsmoothed IPD vs. Predictive Hedges
As can be seen, the error terms vary considerably on a month to month basis, from less than 0.004
to .1348 as measured as the differences between the reported and calculated IPD index values.
However, the largest monthly error terms occur within the same time periods for each
methodology used and appear to be grouped primarily in the months of June through August and
particularly in the month of November. This consistency could well indicate that the hedge is not
reacting well to certain movements within either the IPD index or perhaps specific stock market
shocks. This is confirmed somewhat by analyzing the following Exhibit 4.2 which shows a graph
of all of the error terms together.
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Exhibit 4.2: Comparative Error Terms
While this
1.
2.
3.
graph is difficult to read, the following general relationships can be observed:
The errors from the replicative and rebalanced hedges move in the same manner.
The errors from the reconfigured hedges also move together.
The errors from all of the hedges generally move together.
A possible explanation for the volatility of the errors lies in the overall accuracy of the replicating
procedure. Recall that the R-squared terms of the regressions used to create the hedges were
generally between .85 and .90. Recall also that the R-squared terms of the unsmoothing technique
were typically below .80 (refer to Appendix III). The observed errors shown above probably a
reflection of the error terms left over from the regressions. These errors, therefore, demonstrate an
intrinsic risk of our hedging strategy.
However, it is important to note that the intrinsic risk demonstrated above is most prevalent in the
short term, month to month basis. If the error terms are viewed as a moving average or if the
hedge results, as measured by the cumulative or average error terms, is viewed on a long term (6
month) basis, the apparent risk is greatly reduced. In fact, over the 14 month test period the
average error terms are all below 0.01, and are below 0.002 for all of the reconfigured hedges for
the Industrial Sector and are all below 0.003 for the All Property Sector. (See Appendix X). The
fact that these error terms tend toward zero indicates that there is not a systematic problem with
the methodology used to compile the hedge. For comparison the absolute value of the averages of
the error terms are plotted below in Exhibit 4.3:
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Exhibit 4.3: Absolute Values of Error Terms Averages
As shown above, generally the strongest results were generated by reconfiguring the hedge. Also,
rebalancing the hedge ratios produced stronger results than the static hedge. These results were
consistent with the idea that incorporating more data should produce better results. However, the
best overall results were arguably produced by reconfiguring the hedge on a semiannual basis and
not on a monthly basis. Initially we had expected the we would achieve better results the more
often the hedge was reset, due to the fact that this would incorporate the most recent data. A
possible explanation could be that the observations within the shorter time period are more volatile
and random and therefore could be producing less reliable results (refer to Chapter 2.4 for a more
in depth discussion). Another possible explanation could be that apparently our hedging strategy
does not completely link real estate and public security markets.
Exhibit 4.4 below shows the results of the predictive returns from the semiannually reconfigured
hedge as a continuation of the industrial index. Note that while the hedge does diverge from the
unsmoothed index for a short period of time, it converges towards the IPD within several months.
While we would like to believe that this apparent convergence is due to an economically
justifiable hedge, the results do not warrant such a strong endorsement. Additional data and
observations are required to substantiate this type of argument. (See Appendices XI - XIV for
complete results).
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Exhibit 4.4: Predictive Hedge, Reconfigured Semiannually vs. IPD unsmoothed Index
4.3 Conclusions
The objective of this chapter was to create a predictive hedge for the unsmoothed IPD. As the
returns generated by the various hedging scenarios we tested deviated from the reported returns by
over 8% in some months, our results are inconclusive. On a short term basis, these results are not
very strong, and leads us to conclude that the hedges do a relatively poor job of predicting the
returns generated by real estate on a month to month basis.
However, over a longer period of time, the error terms effectively average to zero, as would be
expected if there were an underlying economic justification for the relationship. When compiling
an index of the returns, the hedge values generally tend to follow the IPD Index over the longer
term.
Chapter 5: Summary and Conclusions
Throughout this thesis we have sought to study two basic ideas; whether or not the returns from
real estate be replicated and whether they be predicted using publicly available securities. We
believe that the statistical analysis of our results, as presented above, demonstrates that real estate
returns can be replicated. The ability to predict the returns was less conclusive, although we make
an argument that overall indices of real estate and the predictive hedges generally do move
together. Discussed below are our interpretations as to the implications of these findings.
5.1 Replicating Real Estate Returns
Our first line of investigation sought to determine if there was a quantifiable link between
unsecuritized commercial real estate returns and publicly traded securities. We hypothesized that
there should be a strong link between the financial well being of the real estate's end users and the
value of the real estate itself. Accordingly, we compiled a list of the largest users of real estate by
using the number of employees as a proxy. In doing so, we limited ourselves only to publicly
traded companies. We also included various stock indices, government bond returns and property
companies to attempt to capture additional components of the return series. Our results indeed
indicate a strong relationship between the stock returns of the largest users and property
companies with the returns generated by real estate.
If one accepts the rationale used to recover the true underlying real estate returns (i.e. the
unsmoothing techniques), then it can be stated that approximately 85% to 92% of these returns can
be explained by the combination of 15 carefully selected publicly traded securities. Furthermore,
these returns could be obtained without the illiquidity, property management expense and
idiosyncratic exposure inherent to owning the physical asset. The implications of this could have
far reaching impact on the way real estate is viewed by investors. As discussed in the introduction
to this thesis, it is a widely held belief that investing in real estate benefits a stock and bond
portfolio by lowering the portfolio's overall volatility per unit risk through the benefits of
diversification.
However, if real estate returns can be replicated using only contemporaneously existing
publicly traded securities, then in fact, real estate does not bring any diversification benefits
to a portfolio that are not already available in the security markets.
The strategy used in our research involved the use of only publicly available information for both
the real estate and security returns. The drawback to this type of data involves the use of appraisal
based real estate indices as a proxy for the underlying asset returns. As discussed in Chapter 2, it
is widely accepted that these indices do not directly reflect the true returns to real estate as
reported. Although we feel the methodology followed to recover the "true" returns is an
improvement over the reported returns, it is impossible to quantify how accurate these true returns
may be. Since our research utilized these unsmoothed returns as a benchmark, our results are only
as accurate as the unsmoothing techniques themselves.
5.2 Development of a Predictive Hedge
In developing a replicative hedge, it is important to note that it can not actually be purchased as
the coefficients are determined ex post. If an investor wishes to either hedge real estate risk or use
a basket of securities as a proxy for real estate, the components must be known ex ante. The
objective of a predictive hedge is to predetermine the components and their weightings.
As described above in Chapter 4, the methodology investigated herein allowed for a number of
variations to be tested, including different time periods for readjusting the hedge portfolio. In
testing these options, we initially thought that there would be a positive correlation between the
accuracy of the hedge and the frequency with which it would be readjusted or reconfigured. That
is, the more frequently the hedge was adjusted the more current the data would be, and therefore
the stronger the anticipated results.
Our results, however, did not explicitly confirm this. We found that though the results for the
reconfigured hedge portfolio were superior to the rebalanced and static hedge, they did not
improve with greater frequency of reconfiguration. One possible explanation for this lies in the
unexplained components and randomness that exists in a hedge that is able to replicate the
underlying returns only to approximately 90%. Reconfiguring the portfolios monthly, or even
quarterly, appears to increase the differences between the reported and calculated return values.
From our results, it appears that reconfiguring the hedge does significantly lower the error terms
and that the best results are attained by allowing the hedge to remain in place for approximately
six months at a time. This methodology resulted in an average error term of only 0.002 over the
14 month test period.
We based our analysis on the measurements of the differences between the unsmoothed monthly
returns and the predicted monthly returns of the hedge. In analyzing these error terms for the
various methods described above, we observed that although there were differences between the
accuracy of the different methods, all methods averaged less than a 0.01 error over the 14 month
test period. For the All Property Sector, the results averaged less than 0.003. However, with
standard deviations of more than 5.0% the hedges are quite volatile and may not be a viable tool
for a short time frame investment.
In summary, our results in developing a hedge to predict the returns generated by the IPD are
modest when viewed on a month to month basis. However, when comparing indices, the hedge
and IPD seemingly move roughly together. An investor wishing to use this type of hedge would
either need to accept the short term return deviations or be willing to hold onto the hedge for
several months.
5.3 Issues with Implementation
Probably the largest issue with implementing our findings will be the use of an appraisal based
index as a proxy for real estate and economically justifying the unsmoothing techniques to
investors. Confirming any underlying relationships to real estate returns will always be only as
accurate as the measurements used for those returns. Until a widely accepted and accurate
measure of real estate returns can be established, this question will continue to cast a shadow on
empirical real estate related research. Specific to our research on the U.K. market, was the lack of
readily available long term data. Unfortunately, this limited our ability to test the dynamic hedges
over a longer period of time. Additionally, an investor may not agree with our assumptions of 20%
volatility for the stock market and 75% of this amount for the property price volatility. Differing
these assumptions will not affect either the methodology or the resulting selection of securities.
Of course, what will change will be the hedge ratios which in turn will alter the number of shares
of a given security in the hedge.
With regard to previous attempts at hedging real estate, most have tended to suffer from lack of
acceptability in the marketplace. In addition, these previous approaches have lacked the ability to
create specific hedging instruments for specific idiosyncratic risks by relying on a newly
composed index or security. These short comings have invariably lead to a lack of a market
viability as evidenced by thin trading volume.
Our technique was different. First, we segregated the market into sectors, which could allow
investors the ability to hedge more specific risks. Second, the securities needed to create the
hedge are publicly available stocks that have significant trading volume of their own accord. This
implies that an investor who wishes to hedge, for example, the industrial sector may do so by
entering the public securities market without having to rely on a particular counterparty. This will
assure liquidity. Third, we utilized return data, as opposed to prices, when running our
regressions.
Transaction costs are also an issue. On the one hand, in terms of utilizing a replicating hedge to
achieve the apparent diversification benefits of real estate in portfolio management, transaction
costs would be greatly reduced, as compared with actually purchasing the assets. In terms of
developing a predictive hedge, however, transaction costs could well become a limiting factor to
the number of securities held, as well as the frequency of rebalancing and/or reconfiguring the
hedge portfolio. Transaction costs would certainly become part of the equation.
In terms of actually implementing the dynamic hedging methodology, another practical problem
arises due to the inherent lag that exists between the end of a reporting period and the time the data
becomes available. For the purpose of this research, we assumed that there was no reporting lag
and utilized the data as if it were contemporaneously available. Assuming a thirty day lag the
effect of this problem would be to limit the hedger's ability to utilize the previous month's return
data in developing the static replicating hedge. Given that the predictive ability of the hedge
appears to be somewhat limited in the short term, perhaps this is not a very limiting factor, since
investors would need a longer time frame than one month to achieve an accurate hedge.
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CBOE REIT Index Options
Symbol: RIX
Index composition:
American Health Properties Inc.
Avalon Properties Inc.
CBL and Associates Properties Inc.
Duke Realty Investments Inc.
Debartolo Realty Corp.
Equity Residential Properties Trust
Federal Realty Investment Trust
General Growth Properties Inc.
Glimcher Trust
Health Care Property Investors Inc.
HGI Realty, Inc.
Kimco Realty Corp.
Manufactured Home Communities
Merry Land & Investment Co.
Nationwide Health Properties Inc.
New Plan Realty Trust
Post Properties Inc.
Public Storage
Security Capital Pacific Trust
Simon Property Group Inc.
Spieker Properties Inc.
Taubman Centers Inc.
United Dominion Realty Trust Inc.
Washington Real Estate Investment Trust
Weingarten Realty Investors
Monthly Trading Volume (1995)
Number of Contracts
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
3,650
40
4,838
1,742
1,018
2,224
105
553
186
345
488
Appendix I
CBOE REIT Index Options
Industrial Sector
Reported Returns
Industrial Sector
I & 3 Month Lagged Returns
Sample: 1987:04 1996:04
Included observations: 109
Sample: 1987:01 1996:04
Included observations: 112
Autocorrelation Partial Autocorrelation
. |**** |
. |* |I
.1|** |
.*|. |I
. I |
. I |
. I |
.*|. |I
.*l. |I
. I |
AC PAC Q-Stat
1 0.896 0.896 92.287
2 0.843 0.206 174.77
3 0.799 0.082 249.64
4 0.721 -0.168 311.15
5 0.634 -0.174 359.08
6 0.569 0.004 398.14
7 0.495 -0.033 427.91
8 0.422 -0.01 449.77
9 0.35 -0.059 464.97
10 0.309 0.107 476.9
11 0.237 -0.118 484
12 0.165 -0.114 487.47
13 0.116 -0.006 489.21
14 0.066 0.005 489.78
Office Sector
Reported Returns
Sample: 1987:01 1996:04
Included observations: 112
Autocorrelation Partial Autocorrelation
*
.1*
~ ***** I
.1
.*l. I
.*l. I
.*l. I
.*I. I
.*I. I
I. I
.*l. I
I. I
I. I
I. I
I. I
AC PAC Q-Stat
1 0.871 0.871 87.319
2 0.842 0.346 169.7
3 0.836 0.257 251.56
4 0.782 -0.061 323.83
5 0.728 -0.129 387.02
6 0.675 -0.141 441.91
7 0.618 -0.101 488.33
8 0.558 -0.071 526.55
9 0.503 -0.018 557.9
10 0.434 -0.079 581.43
11 0.39 0.049 600.61
12 0.327 -0.047 614.24
13 0.275 0.015 624.03
14 0.226 -0.023 630.68
Prob
Prob
Autocorrelation Partial Autocorrelation
.I * | .3 * |
.1|* | . |* |
.1|* | . |* |
. |. | .*|. |I
. |. | . |. |
- l. | . |. |
. |. | . |. |
.*|. | .*|. |I
.1|* | .1|* |
.. |- I . |. |I
. |. I . |. |
-|. | . |. |
.1|* | . |* |
Office Sector
1 & 3 Month Lagged Returns
Sample: 1987:04 1996:04
Included observations: 109
AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.054
2 0.136
3 0.148
4 0.075
5 -0.044
6 0.048
7 -0.025
8 0.03
9 -0.132
10 0.108
11 -0.011
12 -0.05
13 -0.031
14 0.179
Autocorrelation Partial Autocorrelation
.*l. I .~I. I
I ~
.1* I .1* I
.1* I .1* I
.1* .1.
.1. I .1. I
.1. I .1.
.1. I .~I. I
.1* I .1. I
.*l. I .~I. I
.1* I .1. I
.1. I .1. I
.1. I .1. I
.1. I .1* I
-0.054 0.3316 0.565
0.133 2.4175 0.299
0.165 4.9013 0.179
0.079 5.5483 0.236
-0.08 5.7733 0.329
-0.008 6.0401 0.419
-0.031 6.1135 0.527
0.037 6.2235 0.622
-0.125 8.3315 0.501
0.09 9.7601 0.462
0.036 9.7761 0.551
-0.043 10.087 0.608
-0.056 10.204 0.677
0.169 14.301 0.428
AC PAC Q-Stat
1 -0.089
2 0.207
3 0.066
4 0.121
5 0.075
6 0.053
7 0.058
8 -0.028
9 0.068
10 -0.098
11 0.08
12 -0.055
13 -0.001
14 0.043
-0.089 0.8805
0.2 5.7058
0.104 6.2067
0.099 7.901
0.064 8.5472
0.018 8.8817
0.022 9.2844
-0.062 9.3803
0.024 9.9373
-0.099 11.109
0.04 11.907
-0.015 12.287
-0.021 12.287
0.067 12.525
Prob
0.348
0.058
0.102
0.095
0.129
0.18
0.233
0.311
0.356
0.349
0.371
0.423
0.504
0.564
Appendix II
Correlogram Results
Retail Sector
Reported Returns
Retail Sector
1 & 3 Month Lagged Returns
Sample: 1987:04 1996:04
Included observations: 109
Sample: 1987:01 1996:04
Included observations: 112
Autocorrelation Partial Autocorrelation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob Autocorrelation Partial Autocorrelation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.872 0.872 87.431
2 0.799 0.163 161.58
3 0.771 0.194 231.18
4 0.692 -0.143 287.85
5 0.626 -0.027 334.58
6 0.539 -0.183 369.56
7 0.456 -0.056 394.85
8 0.378 -0.082 412.39
9 0.289 -0.068 422.75
10 0.204 -0.072 427.96
11 0.135 0.012 430.27
12 0.075 0.021 431
13 0.008 -0.036 431.01
14 -0.06 -0.066 431.48
I. I
I. I
.1* I
I. I
.1* I
I. I
I. I
I. I
I. I
I. I
I. I
I.
I. I
I. I
I. I
.1*
I. I
.1*
I. I
I. I
I.
I. I
.*I.
.*I.
I. I
I. I
I. I
All Property Sector
I & 3 Month Lagged Returns
Sample: 1987:04 1996:04
Included observations: 109
Sample: 1987:01 1996:04
Included observations: 112
1 0.019 0.019 0.0396 0.842
2 0.046 0.046 0.2831 0.868
3 0.159 0.158 3.1807 0.365
4 -0.008 -0.015 3.1876 0.527
5 0.133 0.122 5.2382 0.388
6 0.006 -0.023 5.2425 0.513
7 0.005 0 5.2453 0.63
8 0.04 0.001 5.4412 0.71
9 -0.042 -0.039 5.6525 0.774
10 -0.057 -0.077 6.0505 0.811
11 -0.057 -0.06 6.4509 0.842
12 0.02 0.04 6.5024 0.889
13 -0.046 -0.031 6.7641 0.914
14 -0.021 0.007 6.8191 0.941
Autocorrelation Partial Autocorrelation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob Autocorrelation Partial Autocorrelation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
0.902 93.53
0.28 180.45
0.12 262.12
-0.215 330.53
-0.147 387.94
-0.112 434.85
-0.011 472.42
-0.054 500.74
-0.042 521.27
-0.041 535.46
-0.023 544.49
-0.067 549.3
0.042 551.82
0.041 552.87
*1. I .*I.
.1* I .1*
.1* I
I. I . I.
.1* I .1.
I. I . I.
I. I . I.
I. I . I.
I. I . I.
I. I . I.
I. I . I.
.*I. I .~l.
.1. I .~I.
.1* I .1*
1 -0.066
2 0.192
3 0.192
4 0.04
5 0.07
6 0.019
7 0.046
8 -0.004
9 0.005
10 -0.029
11 -0.001
12 -0.083
13 -0.053
14 0.091
-0.066 0.4874 0.485
0.189 4.6743 0.097
0.224 8.878 0.031
0.038 9.0623 0.06
-0.005 9.6251 0.087
-0.036 9.6683 0.139
0.017 9.9179 0.193
-0.013 9.9203 0.271
-0.01 9.9237 0.357
-0.042 10.024 0.438
-0.005 10.024 0.528
-0.076 10.882 0.539
-0.057 11.241 0.591
0.126 12.297 0.582
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Correlogram Results
. I******|
. I**** |
. |*** |
.* |
.*|. |
.1* I
.1* I
* *1. I
* I. I
* *1. I
* I. I
* *1. I
* *1. I
* *1. I
* I. I
* I. I
* I. I
* *1. I
All Property Sector
Reported Returns
.1*~
~ **** ~
.1* I
.1* I
.1* I
.1* I
**I.
*1.1
*1.1
I. I
I. I
I. I
I.
I. I
*1. I
I. I
I. I
1 0.902
2 0.865
3 0.835
4 0.761
5 0.694
6 0.624
7 0.556
8 0.48
9 0.407
10 0.337
11 0.267
12 0.194
13 0.14
14 0.09
Industry Sector
LS // Dependent Variable is IND
Sample(adjusted): 1987:04 1996:04
Included observations: 109 after adjusting endpoints
LS // Dependent Variable is OFF
Sample(adjusted): 1987:04 1996:04
Included observations: 109 after adjusting endpoints
Variable
IND(-1)
IND(-3)
C
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat
Coefficient Std. Error
0.767849
0.154619
0.000194
0.812081
0.808535
0.005268
0.002941
418.6899
2.10769
0.078674
0.078769
0.000526
t-Statistic
9.759838
1.962951
0.368514
Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)
Prob. Variable
OFF(-1)
OFF(-3)
0
0.0523
0.7132
0.003316
0.012038
-10.46521
-10.39114
229.0359
0
Retail Sector
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat
All Property Sector
Coefficient Std. Error
0.580178
0.347307
5.59E-06
0.797747
0.793931
0.006008
0.003827
404.3478
2.176902
0.081333
0.081249
0.000576
t-Statistic
7.133325
4.274586
0.009697
Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)
LS // Dependent Variable is RE
Sample(adjusted): 1987:04 1996:04
Included observations: 109 after adjusting endpoints
LS // Dependent Variable is ALL
Sample(adjusted): 1987:04 1996:04
Included observations: 109 after adjusting endpoints
Variable
RE(-1)
RE(-3)
C
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat
Coefficient Std. Error
0.707047
0.207307
0.000106
0.777237
0.773034
0.004309
0.001968
440.5759
1.960742
0.076343
0.076415
0.000426
t-Statistic
9.261423
2.712916
0.249994
Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)
Prob.
0
0.0078
0.8031
0.002055
0.009046
-10.86679
-10.79272
184.921
0
Variable
ALL(-1)
ALL(-3)
C
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat
Coefficient Std. Error
0.712898
0.219034
6.44E-05
0.826155
0.822875
0.004477
0.002125
436.4104
2.131201
0.080998
0.08103
0.000436
t-Statistic
8.801412
2.703134
0.147885
Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)
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Regression Results for 1 and 3 Month Lags
Prob.
0
0
0.9923
0.000576
0.013236
-10.20206
-10.12798
209.0486
0
Prob.
0
0.008
0.8827
0.001734
0.010638
-10.79036
-10.71629
251.8698
0
Office Sector
Industrial Sector
0.02
0.01
0.02 -
----------
-0.01 - " U- 
\iv- p _0Arq 
-
-0.02
0.06
0.04
0.02
0.00
-0.02
Residual - Actual ---- Fitted
Office Sector
0.02
0.01
0.00
-0.01
-0.02
-0.03
I_-_Residual ------- Actual ---- Fitted
Retail Sector
0.04
0.02
0.00
-0.02
88... ..9 '90 1 9. ~...11 k .- 92 03 '9... 4 '....956.... '6
I_-_Residual ----- Actual ---- Fitted
All Property Sector
0.02
0.01
0.00 _
-0.01
-0.02
___ Residual ------- Actual ---- Fitted
Appendix IV
Actual Returns vs. Fitted Returns
0.04
0.02
0.00
-0.02
-0.04
A A A
0.02
0.01
0.00
-0.01
-0.02
Calculation of w(o):
w(O)=[SSE/(n-2)]A.5/[a*(st dev FTSE)]
where:
a = 0.6000
st dev FTSE= 0.2000 annually
0.0577 monthly
1-month 3-month
w(ol coefficient coefficient
Industrial 0.1513 0.7678 0.1546
Office 0.0577 0.5802 0.3473
Retail 0.1238 0.7070 0.2073
All Property 0.1286 0.7129 0.2190
Calculated underlying return for two period lag:
r(t)=[1/w(0)]*[r(t)*-Beta1*r(t-1)*-Beta2*r(t-3)*]]
Monthly Returns
Reported Unsmoothed Reported
Industrial Industrial r(t) Office
0.1673 0.0338
-0.0162 0.7220
0.4319 0.0532
0.4842 0.8371 0.1246
0.6972 2.1668 0.9644
0.9608 2.3700 0.3884
1.5072 4.5892 1.8661
0.8149 -2.9748 0.9004
1.7173 6.2311 0.9479
1.8787 2.1608 2.1546
0.4797 -7.1943 1.3653
0.7949 1.0636 1.2582
0.7048 -1.2954 0.9274
1.6255 6.6749 2.5793
1.4688 0.6456 0.7345
2.5336 8.5687 2.1814
2.5311 2.2093 2.5842
2.8004 4.1611 3.2981
2.7019 1.0567 2.6780
4.1277 10.9795 1.8209
2.4960 -7.3107 1.8384
1.7002 -4.1899 2.0070
2.1528 1.3812 2.6671
2.6744 4.1991 2.3832
1.8313 -3.2054 1.2672
1.8344 0.6300 1.6343
1.7043 -0.7784 1.7645
1.7265 0.8900 1.3639
1.7314 0.8070 1.5836
2.3245 4.8333 1.6418
1.9385 -0.7485 1.3868
2.3082 3.6471 0.9736
1.5225 -4.0258 1.0693
0.7008 -5.0739 0.5862
0.1119 -5.1742 0.1149
-0.3076 -4.1556 0.3485
0.1168 1.6164 0.0076
-0.2390 -2.2866 -0.7097
-0.9396 -4.6810 -0.2935
-0.2073 3.2776 -0.3902
-1.6878 -9.8562 -2.9955
-1.0785 2.3969 -0.9177
Unsmoothed Reported Unsmoothed Reported Unsmoothed
Office r(t) Retai Retail r(t) All All Property r(t)
0.4753
3.7150
-1.0984
9.2530
-2.9960
1.6837
5.5405
-1.1438
0.7925
-3.1909
9.0771
-6.9444
8.3010
2.4489
8.9418
0.0403
-3.6509
-2.1054
0.0592
5.0411
1.1427
-4.7064
-0.1577
-0.0662
-0.5785
1.3014
0.6387
-0.2284
-2.2072
-0.3811
-2.9880
-3.2626
-0.5187
-2.3064
-4.3673
-0.0159
-1.2892
-14.6122
5.3414
0.2433
0.2686
0.5682
0.5901
0.0089
0.1697
1.1175
0.8339
1.2067
1.6062
0.8130
1.4201
0.7290
1.2665
1.2818
1.9643
1.6781
1.4850
1.5792
1.3611
1.8548
1.3224
0.7869
1.4259
0.6840
0.5044
0.5130
0.9700
1.0301
0.4987
0.4405
0.5509
0.1440
-0.0181
-0.6277
-0.7683
-0.6550
-0.7553
-0.7963
-0.8995
-1.6263
-1.0559
1.1140
-3.7478
0.3683
7.0690
0.3393
4.7002
4.2111
-4.0024
4.8068
-4.9114
4.7050
0.7424
7.3250
0.2158
0.2649
0.9856
-0.8349
4.7220
-2.5556
-3.4757
3.9175
-4.8324
-1.1502
-1.1246
3.7602
1.9356
-2.7137
-0.9140
0.2090
-2.8182
-1.7059
-5.8893
-2.8620
-0.8725
-1.3091
-0.8319
-1.6216
-6.7345
2.0930
0.1458
0.4233
0.3430
0.3929
0.4694
0.3369
1.4540
0.8590
1.1541
1.8656
1.0043
1.2841
0.8105
1.8454
1.0711
2.1176
2.1477
2.4017
2.1753
1.8628
1.9189
1.6669
1.7611
1.9874
1.0894
1.1715
1.2296
1.2471
1.3684
1.2697
1.0956
1.0465
0.7843
0.3641
-0.1817
-0.2282
-0.2266
-0.6338
-0.6101
-0.5433
-2.2374
-1.0028
0.9053
0.7508
-0.5670
8.7670
-2.1792
3.6369
5.6315
-3.9945
2.4513
-3.9925
8.1439
-4.0870
9.1458
1.8179
4.9436
-0.0056
-1.2313
0.5044
-1.3798
1.2805
2.4227
-5.3838
0.0709
-0.3175
1.0254
1.7315
0.1931
-0.6435
-0.2659
-1.8645
-3.3813
-5.2119
-2.1025
-1.1173
-3.3617
-0.8413
-0.4571
-13.3023
5.6427
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Monthly Indices
Reported Unsmoothed Reported Unsmoothed Reported Unsmoothed
Industrial Industrial Office Office Retail Retail
100.1673 100.0000 100.0338 100.0000 100.2433 100.0000
100.1511 100.0000 100.7560 100.0000 100.5126 100.0000
100.5836 100.0000 100.8096 100.0000 101.0837 100.0000
101.0706 100.8371 100.9352 100.4753 101.6801 101.1140
101.7753 103.0220 101.9087 104.2080 101.6892 97.3244
102.7532 105.4636 102.3045 103.0634 101.8617 97.6828
104.3019 110.3036 104.2135 112.5999 103.0000 104.5880
105.1518 107.0223 105.1518 109.2264 103.8589 104.9429
106.9576 113.6909 106.1486 111.0654 105.1122 109.8753
108.9669 116.1475 108.4357 117.2189 106.8005 114.5022
109.4897 107.7915 109.9162 115.8782 107.6688 109.9195
110.3600 108.9380 111.2991 116.7965 109.1978 115.2030
111.1377 107.5268 112.3312 113.0697 109.9939 109.5450
112.9443 114.7041 115.2286 123.3332 111.3869 114.6990
114.6032 115.4446 116.0750 114.7684 112.8146 115.5506
117.5067 125.3367 118.6070 124.2954 115.0306 124.0147
120.4810 128.1057 121.6720 127.3393 116.9609 124.2823
123.8549 133.4363 125.6849 138.7257 118.6978 124.6115
127.2013 134.8464 129.0508 138.7815 120.5723 125.8397
132.4518 149.6519 131.4007 133.7147 122.2134 124.7891
135.7578 138.7112 133.8164 130.8995 124.4802 130.6817
138.0660 132.8994 136.5021 130.9770 126.1263 127.3420
141.0382 134.7350 140.1427 137.5797 127.1188 122.9159
144.8102 140.3927 143.4826 139.1518 128.9313 127.7312
147.4622 135.8926 145.3008 132.6028 129.8133 121.5587
150.1672 136.7487 147.6754 132.3937 130.4680 120.1606
152.7265 135.6842 150.2811 132.3061 131.1373 118.8093
155.3632 136.8919 152.3308 131.5408 132.4094 123.2768
158.0533 137.9966 154.7431 133.2526 133.7733 125.6630
161.7272 144.6665 157.2837 134.1037 134.4404 122.2528
164.8623 143.5836 159.4650 133.7974 135.0326 121.1355
168.6676 148.8203 161.0174 130.8443 135.7765 121.3886
171.2355 142.8290 162.7391 130.3456 135.9720 117.9677
172.4356 135.5820 163.6930 126.4509 135.9475 115.9553
172.6286 128.5667 163.8811 122.3253 135.0941 109.1263
172.0976 123.2240 164.4522 121.6907 134.0563 106.0032
172.2987 125.2158 164.4647 118.8841 133.1782 105.0783
171.8868 122.3527 163.2976 113.6921 132.1724 103.7028
170.2719 116.6253 162.8184 113.6740 131.1199 102.8400
169.9189 120.4478 162.1831 112.2085 129.9404 101.1724
167.0509 108.5761 157.3248 95.8124 127.8272 94.3590
165.2492 111.1786 155.8811 100.9301 126.4775 96.3339
Reported Unsmoothed
All All
100.1458 100.0000
100.5697 100.0000
100.9147 100.0000
101.3112 100.9053
101.7868 101.6629
102.1297 101.0865
103.6147 109.9487
104.5047 107.5527
105.7108 111.4643
107.6830 117.7414
108.7644 113.0382
110.1611 115.8092
111.0539 111.1854
113.1033 120.2403
114.3147 115.3261
116.7355 125.8736
119.2426 128.1619
122.1064 134.4977
124.7625 134.4902
127.0865 132.8342
129.5252 133.5042
131.6843 131.6622
134.0034 133.3482
136.6666 136.5788
138.1554 129.2257
139.7739 129.3174
141.4926 128.9068
143.2572 130.2286
145.2175 132.4836
147.0613 132.7395
148.6725 131.8852
150.2284 131.5346
151.4067 129.0821
151.9580 124.7174
151.6820 118.2172
151.3359 115.7317
150.9929 114.4387
150.0359 110.5916
149.1206 109.6611
148.3104 109.1599
144.9921 94.6391
143.5381 99.9793
Calculation of Unsmoothed Returns and Indices
1987 Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
1988 Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
1989 Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
1990 Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Industrial Industrial r(t) Office Office r(t) Retal Retail r(t) Al All Property r(t) Industrial Industrial Office Office Retail Retail Alt All
Jul -1.0904 -1.5208 -1.2133 -3.1588 -0.8923 0.3288 -1.0723 -1.8532 163.4474 109.4878 153.9898 97.7419 125.3489 96.6507 141.9990 98.1265
Aug -0.9340 1.0849 -1.5090 1.3628 -1.2231 -2.0598 -1.2858 -0.2432 161.9208 110.6757 151.6660 99.0739 123.8158 94.6598 140.1732 97.8879
Sep -0.8416 0.2797 -1.6698 -2.7549 -1.1881 -0.8438 -1.3204 -1.4311 160.5581 110.9853 149.1335 96.3446 122.3447 93.8611 138.3224 96.4870
1990 Oct -1.0503 -1.5557 -1.3923 -0.0123 -1.2099 -1.4935 -1.2542 -0.6070 158.8718 109.2587 147.0571 96.3328 120.8644 92.4592 136.5875 95.9013
Nov -1.0829 -0.8723 -1.3492 -0.1004 -0.7456 2.9353 -1.0672 0.8444 157.1514 108.3056 145.0730 96.2360 119.9632 95.1732 135.1299 96.7111
Dec -1.1887 -1.5007 -1.5860 -1.2935 -1.1745 -3.2386 -1.3491 -2.3249 155.2833 106.6803 142.7721 94.9913 118.5543 92.0909 133.3069 94.4627
1991 Jan -0.7968 1.8392 -2.1056 -4.0653 -0.7573 2.6162 -1.3367 -0.7795 154.0460 108.6423 139.7659 91.1296 117.6565 94.5002 131.5250 93.7264
Feb -0.8981 -0.7850 -1.3836 1.7760 -0.7314 -0.3339 -1.0382 1.1543 152.6625 107.7894 137.8321 92.7480 116.7960 94.1847 130.1595 94.8083
Mar -0.7477 0.8308 -1.2039 0.8668 -1.0094 -2.0097 -1.0348 0.0068 151.5212 108.6849 136.1727 93.5519 115.6170 92.2918 128.8126 94.8147
Apr -0.3228 2.4743 -1.7676 -1.9570 -0.4218 3.6259 -0.9421 0.6867 151.0320 111.3741 133.7657 91.7211 115.1293 95.6382 127.5991 95.4658
May -0.0860 1.9872 -0.9749 3.0770 -0.3290 0.9764 -0.5308 2.8627 150.9021 113.5873 132.4616 94.5434 114.7506 96.5721 126.9218 98.1988
Jun 0.2718 2.9961 -1.1342 -0.8715 -0.1390 2.4463 -0.4377 1.3006 151.3123 116.9905 130.9593 93.7195 114.5911 98.9345 126.3663 99.4759
Jul -0.3542 -3.3894 -1.9025 -3.6523 -0.4956 -2.5028 -1.0217 -3.9126 150.7764 113.0252 128.4678 90.2966 114.0232 96.4584 125.0751 95.5838
Aug 0.1991 3.2000 -1.0133 2.4853 -0.2914 1.0274 -0.4687 2.9225 151.0766 116.6421 127.1661 92.5408 113.6910 97.4493 124.4889 98.3773
Sep 0.4628 1.7704 -1.3747 -2.2757 -0.0805 1.2470 -0.4612 -0.2423 151.7758 118.7072 125.4180 90.4348 113.5995 98.6645 123.9148 98.1389
Oct 0.0053 -1.9511 -0.9243 3.0930 -0.0892 0.5692 -0.3897 1.2661 151.7839 116.3911 124.2588 93.2319 113.4982 99.2261 123.4319 99.3814
Nov 0.1355 0.6646 -0.8610 0.1576 0.4066 4.2816 -0.1429 1.8472 151.9895 117.1647 123.1889 93.3788 113.9597 103.4746 123.2556 101.2171
Dec 0.0487 -0.8386 -1.3335 -2.0653 0.3064 0.2875 -0.3599 -1.2211 152.0635 116.1821 121.5462 91.4502 114.3089 103.7720 122.8119 99.9812
1992 Jan 0.1605 0.8084 -0.8743 1.2766 -0.0627 -2.1068 -0.3113 0.2383 152.3076 117.1214 120.4835 92.6177 114.2372 101.5857 122.4296 100.2195
Feb -0.6422 -5.1964 -1.2642 -2.6523 -0.1061 -1.1801 -0.6598 -3.1609 151.3295 111.0353 118.9604 90.1612 114.1160 100.3869 121.6218 97.0517
Mar -0.6144 -0.8512 -1.6538 -2.6486 0.0034 0.1208 -0.7441 -1.5152 150.3997 110.0902 116.9930 87.7732 114.1199 100.5081 120.7168 95.5812
Apr -0.4756 -0.1895 -1.0135 1.4464 -0.0788 -0.5514 -0.5045 0.7323 149.6843 109.8816 115.8073 89.0428 114.0300 99.9539 120.1078 96.2811
May -0.5723 -0.7122 -0.7758 1.4555 0.0186 0.7785 -0.3962 0.8391 148.8276 109.0990 114.9089 90.3388 114.0512 100.7320 119.6319 97.0890
Jun -1.1421 -4.0152 -1.5116 -2.8214 -0.0365 -0.4070 -0.8054 -2.7980 147.1278 104.7184 113.1720 87.7900 114.0096 100.3219 118.6684 94.3724
Jul -0.6885 1.7314 -1.1377 0.5289 -0.1038 -0.4981 -0.6050 0.6197 146.1149 106.5315 111.8845 88.2543 113.8912 99.8222 117.9505 94.9572
Aug -0.9740 -2.3576 -1.5368 -3.5179 -0.5178 -3.6203 -0.9626 -3.4558 144.6918 104.0199 110.1650 85.1496 113.3016 96.2083 116.8151 91.6757
Sep -1.4716 -3.6151 -1.7377 -1.8599 -1.0746 -5.6617 -1.3849 -4.0598 142.5625 100.2594 108.2507 83.5659 112.0841 90.7612 115.1973 87.9539
Oct -0.8218 2.7394 -1.2896 0.6583 -0.2181 4.5493 -0.7149 3.1475 141.3909 103.0060 106.8547 84.1160 111.8396 94.8902 114.3738 90.7223
Nov -0.7633 0.1211 -1.1278 0.8928 -0.2930 -0.2545 -0.6785 0.3268 140.3117 103.1307 105.6495 84.8670 111.5119 94.6487 113.5978 91.0187
Dec -0.8949 -0.5368 -1.3196 -0.3576 -0.3355 0.7631 -0.7859 0.0086 139.0561 102.5771 104.2554 84.5635 111.1378 95.3709 112.7050 91.0265
1993 Jan -0.3381 3.1456 -0.9606 1.4650 -0.3836 -0.8170 -0.5652 1.1788 138.5859 105.8037 103.2539 85.8024 110.7115 94.5918 112.0680 92.0996
Feb -0.5279 -0.9930 -1.1596 -1.2200 -0.2989 0.2672 -0.6288 -0.6008 137.8543 104.7531 102.0566 84.7556 110.3806 94.8445 111.3633 91.5462
Mar -0.3567 1.2358 -0.3539 4.5018 -0.1264 1.2481 -0.2521 2.8634 137.3625 106.0476 101.6954 88.5711 110.2411 96.0282 111.0825 94.1675
Apr -0.5144 -1.2435 -0.3394 1.1560 0.0314 1.6172 -0.2111 0.7186 136.6560 104.7289 101.3503 89.5950 110.2757 97.5812 110.8480 94.8442
May -0.0793 2.6254 -0.1184 2.7874 -0.0265 0.1072 -0.0678 1.7136 136.5477 107.4784 101.2303 92.0924 110.2465 97.6858 110.7729 96.4694
Jun 0.2640 2.5111 0.0518 1.4100 0.8490 7.2207 0.4671 4.4356 136.9082 110.1773 101.2827 93.3909 111.1825 104.7394 111.2903 100.7484
Jul 0.1441 0.1378 0.2628 2.0305 0.7821 1.4161 0.4817 1.5152 137.1054 110.3291 101.5489 95.2872 112.0520 106.2227 111.8263 102.2750
Aug 0.3731 1.8150 0.3959 1.6482 0.3244 -1.8021 0.3573 0.2233 137.6169 112.3316 101.9508 96.8577 112.4155 104.3085 112.2258 102.5034
Sep 0.8573 3.5019 0.8428 3.4469 0.6012 1.5816 0.7317 2.9126 138.7966 116.2654 102.8100 100.1963 113.0913 105.9582 113.0470 105.4889
Oct 0.8646 1.2162 0.9216 1.9777 0.9076 2.5879 0.9020 2.1367 139.9966 117.6794 103.7576 102.1779 114.1177 108.7003 114.0666 107.7428
Nov 1.5269 5.3211 2.0855 8.1861 2.3449 13.2142 2.0949 10.6778 142.1342 123.9412 105.9214 110.5423 116.7937 123.0641 116.4562 119.2474
Dec 2.0779 5.1073 2.5492 6.0620 3.4716 13.6427 2.8979 9.6719 145.0876 130.2713 108.6215 117.2434 120.8483 139.8534 119.8310 130.7809
1994 Jan 1.2343 -3.2704 0.8862 -5.2876 1.4562 -9.5844 1.2327 -8.0129 146.8784 126.0110 109.5842 111.0440 122.6080 126.4493 121.3081 120.3016
Feb 2.2980 7.3619 1.5770 1.9610 1.9210 3.2741 1.8816 4.2288 150.2536 135.2878 111.3123 113.2216 124.9633 130.5894 123.5906 125.3889
Mar 2.6930 4.0118 2.3531 3.2019 2.3857 2.4855 2.4358 3.5728 154.2999 140.7153 113.9316 116.8468 127.9445 133.8352 126.6010 129.8687
Apr 0.8481 -9.3198 0.9034 -4.4577 1.1627 -6.6717 1.0176 -7.6867 155.6086 127.6009 114.9608 111.6381 129.4321 124.9061 127.8893 119.8861
May 0.6600 -2.2898 0.2549 -4.7319 0.6526 -4.5853 0.5266 -4.7495 156.6356 124.6791 115.2539 106.3555 130.2768 119.1787 128.5628 114.1921
Jun 0.2275 -4.5969 -0.4281 -8.0701 0.7710 -1.4946 0.2891 -4.8186 156.9918 118.9477 114.7605 97.7725 131.2812 117.3975 128.9344 108.6897
Jul -0.0412 -2.2927 -0.3093 -2.1705 0.2867 -4.0343 0.0357 -3.0572 156.9272 116.2206 114.4055 95.6504 131.6575 112.6614 128.9804 105.3668
Aug 0.0247 -0.3020 -0.3074 -1.2537 0.1522 -1.5009 -0.0165 -1.2228 156.9659 115.8697 114.0538 94.4512 131.8579 110.9704 128.9591 104.0784
Sep -0.3919 -2.9473 -0.3975 -0.4082 0.1114 -1.2604 -0.1457 -1.5329 156.3508 112.4547 113.6005 94.0656 132.0047 109.5717 128.7713 102.4829
Oct -0.3703 -0.4160 -0.5109 -1.0013 -0.0070 -1.1723 -0.2349 -1.0792 155.7719 111.9868 113.0201 93.1237 131.9955 108.2872 128.4688 101.3769
Nov -0.6510 -2.4481 -0.5153 -0.6493 -0.0295 -0.4535 -0.3026 -1.0225 154.7578 109.2453 112.4377 92.5191 131.9566 107.7961 128.0801 100.3404
Dec -0.7143 -1.0165 -0.3873 0.2881 -0.2044 -1.6690 -0.3586 -0.8630 153.6524 108.1348 112.0023 92.7857 131.6868 105.9970 127.6208 99.4744
1995 Jan -0.1466 3.0336 -0.1152 1.6618 -0.0429 0.8327 -0.0854 1.7237 153.4271 111.4152 111.8732 94.3276 131.6304 106.8796 127.5118 101.1891
Feb -0.6448 -2.8517 -0.3963 -0.8717 -0.4273 -3.1567 -0.4575 -2.5683 152.4378 108.2380 111.4299 93.5053 131.0680 103.5057 126.9284 98.5903
Mar -0.9654 -2.3775 -0.4313 -0.3873 -0.3833 -0.3133 -0.5078 -0.8012 150.9662 105.6646 110.9493 93.1432 130.5656 103.1814 126.2839 97.8004
Apr -0.6088 1.0248 -0.3177 -0.1591 -0.4455 -1.3377 -0.4342 -0.4155 150.0471 106.7475 110.5968 92.9950 129.9840 101.8012 125.7357 97.3940
May -0.4474 0.7914 -0.6191 -1.7213 -0.4134 -0.0794 -0.4863 -0.5956 149.3757 107.5923 109.9120 91.3942 129.4467 101.7204 125.1242 96.8140
Jun -1.0674 -3.7966 -0.5429 -0.1965 -0.5694 -1.5965 -0.6514 -1.5038 147.7813 103.5075 109.3153 91.2147 128.7097 100.0964 124.3091 95.3581
Jul -0.4107 3.3241 -0.3372 0.5106 -0.6404 -1.1753 -0.4982 0.4759 147.1744 106.9482 108.9467 91.6804 127.8854 98.9200 123.6898 95.8120
Aug -0.2214 1.0780 -0.2871 0.7157 -0.2360 2.4436 -0.2498 1.6474 146.8486 108.1011 108.6339 92.3366 127.5836 101.3372 123.3808 97.3904
Sep -0.2598 0.4968 -0.3114 0.2536 -0.3368 -0.4190 -0.3139 0.0532 146.4671 108.6381 108.2957 92.5707 127.1539 100.9126 122.9936 97.4422
Oct -0.3944 -0.8682 -0.2628 0.2024 -0.3012 0.5630 -0.3057 0.2117 145.8894 107.6949 108.0111 92.7581 126.7710 101.4807 122.6176 97.6485
Nov -0.6561 -2.1081 -0.3962 -0.8343 -0.3209 -0.4765 -0.4075 -1.0484 144.9322 105.4246 107.5831 91.9843 126.3642 100.9972 122.1179 96.6247
Dec -0.5209 0.1521 -0.7910 -2.6239 -0.1196 1.4302 -0.4166 -0.4454 144.1772 105.5850 106.7322 89.5706 126.2131 102.4417 121.6092 96.1943
1996 Jan -0.1124 2.3035 -0.1843 2.1195 -0.0098 1.1085 -0.0868 2.1544 144.0152 108.0172 106.5355 91.4691 126.2008 103.5773 121.5037 98.2667
Feb -0.2289 -0.2719 -0.0724 0.9973 -0.1411 -0.5470 -0.1363 0.1151 143.6856 107.7235 106.4584 92.3813 126.0227 103.0107 121.3381 98.3798
Mar -0.1149 0.9341 -0.0972 1.2715 0.0074 1.0659 -0.0513 1.0658 143.5205 108.7297 106.3549 93.5560 126.0320 104.1086 121.2758 99.4284
Apr -0.2322 -0.8363 -0.0252 0.5516 -0.1155 -0.9588 -0.1060 -0.3915 143.1872 107.8204 106.3282 94.0720 125.8864 103.1105 121.1473 99.0391
Appendix V
Calculation of Unsmoothed Returns and Indices
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Appendix VI
Reported Return vs. Unsmoothed Returns
Industrial
1/90-12/94
Retail Sector
1/90-12/94
Multiple R .93908
R Square .88187
Adjusted R Square .84160
Standard Error .01577
Company Name
Compass Group
Dalgety, PLC
Dawson International
Johnson Group
Rank Organisation
Salvesen Christian
Sedgwick Group
Smith & Nephew
Tesco. PLC
Wolseley, PLC
Zeneca Group
Berisford, PLC
Provident Financial
Daejan Holdings
Town Centre Securities
Constant
Beta Coefficient t-stat Primary Business Activity
0.265169
0.232024
-0.19808
0.253835
-0.276595
-0.130593
0.174113
-0.104951
-0.253987
0.161705
0.36809
0.086916
-0.204466
0.193277
-0.114242
-0.002379
-5.807
-4.424
-6.251
-4.986
-5.46
-2.913
-6.25
-2.118
-5.72
-3.908
-4.749
-6.688
-4.297
-3.165
-2.726
-0.988
Industrial Catering contractor
Food manufacturer and Dist.
Textile Manufacturer
Dry Cleaner and Linen Rental
Holding Company / Manufacturer
Food and Brick Manufacturer
Insurance broker / Property Manager
Pharmaceutical manufacturer
Food Proprietors
Sanitaryware manufacturing
Manufact. of Pharm. and Agriculture
Prop. dev., Food and Agribusiness
Holding company
Property company
Property company
Office Sector
1/90-12/94
Multiple R .92262
R Square .85122
Adjusted R Square .80050
Standard Error .01947
Company Name
British Airways. PLC
Dawson International, PLC
Linton Park, PLC
MFI Furniture Group
Powell Duffryn, PLC
Queens Moat Houses
Rolls-Royce, PLC
Tate & Lyle, PLC
Waste Management Intemation
Willis Corroon Group, PLC
Wolseley, PLC
Evans Halshaw Holdings, PLC
Provident Financial, PLC
Land Securities
Trafford Park Estates
Constant
Beta Coefficient t-stat
0.075579
-0.175742
0.233299
0.123782
0.129318
-0.143452
-0.133623
-0.241727
-0.131184
0.238404
0.244999
0.146237
-0.101624
-0.315542
0.197983
-0.008793
1.652
-4.822
5.748
1.941
2.485
-3.517
-3.511
-4.269
-3.457
7.252
4.474
3.292
-1.762
-4.743
6.08
-2.848
Primary Business Activity
Air Transport
Textile Manufacturer
Holding Company
Furniture Retailers
Holding Company
Holding Company
Industrial Engine Manufacturer
Holding Company
Refuse Disposal
Industrial assurance
Plastics
Motor Vehicle Dealer
Holding Company
Property Company
Property Company
Multiple R .96074
R Square .92302
Adjusted R Square .89678
Standard Error .01522
Company Name
William Baird, PLC
Caradon, PLC
Dawson International, PLC
Sedgwick Group, PLC
Smithkline Beecham, PLC
Tate & Lyle, PLC
Cowie Group, PLC
Takare, PLC
Argyll Group, PLC
Dencora
Ocean Group, PLC
Cordiant, PLC
Babcock International Group
Hazlewood Foods, PLC
The RTZ Corporation
Constant
All Property Sectors
1/90-12/94
Multiple R .91827
R Square .84323
Adjusted R Square .78978
Standard Error .02120
Company Name
Dawson International
FKI, PLC
Forte, PLC
Hanson, PLC
Hillsdown Holdings
inchcape, PLC
Retail Corporation
Signet Group
Transport Develop Group
George Wmpey, PLC
Wolseley, PLC
Zeneca Group
Westland Group
Evans Halshaw Holdings
Provident Financial, PLC
Constant
Beta Coefficient t-stat Primary Business Activity
-0.630418
0.268258
-0.226307
0.227638
-0.33914
-0.16019
0.138054
0.084955
0.109905
0.093813
-0.115353
-0.083759
-0.117385
0.158433
0.283284
-0.002921
-13.842
7.707
-6.452
8.65
-8.897
-3.769
5.556
2.449
2.752
3.124
-3.581
-4.685
-5.187
5.631
6.652
-1.33
Beta Coefficient t-stat
-0.206762
0.143015
0.139625
-0.341297
-0.201489
-0.109967
0.308094
-0.110057
-0.200644
0.127504
0.489012
0.296849
0.302759
0.196223
-0.284859
-0.019041
-4.731
3.909
2.415
-4.816
-4.746
-1.879
3.853
-5.441
-4.036
2.771
7.52
3.223
6.328
4.741
-4.403
-5.459
Garment Manufacturer and Retailer
Central Heating
Textile Manufacturer
Insurance Broker / Property Manager
Pharmaceuticals
Holding Company
Car Dealer, Household retailers
Medical Care
Retail Food
Property Company
Distribution Services
Advertising
Holding Company
Food Manufacturing
Metal Stockholder
Primary Business Activity
Knitting Wool Manufacturer
Electronic Manufacturer
Hotel Licensed
Electronic Manufacturer
General Food
Motor Accessories
Boots and Shoes
Jeweller
Transportation
Land and Building Company
Sanitaryware/Plastics Manufacturer
Patent Medicines
Electronic Manufacturer
Motor Vehicle Importer
Holding Company
Appendix VI
Static Replicating Hedge Regression Results
Industrial Sector
1/90 - 12/94
-, N kA A rA,~A~t A~t~
All Property Sector
1/90 - 12/94
Appendix VillI
Replicating Hedge Returns vs. Unsmoothed IPD Returns
Retail Sector
1/90 - 12/94
Office Sector
1/90-12/94
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All Property
Error Terms Analysis
Replicative
Date Hedae
1/31/95 0.01349
2/28/95 0.02541
3/31/95 -0.00308
4/28/95 0.04693
5/31/95 0.00794
6/30/95 0.00987
7/31/95 -0.04222
8/31/95 0.11782
9/29/95 -0.02689
10/31/95 -0.02214
11/30/95 -0.17172
12/29/95 0.05484
1/31/96 0.02760
Rebalanced
Monthly
-0.01789
0.00892
-0.00093
-0.01636
-0.00338
-0.00153
-0.01148
-0.01109
-0.00407
0.01322
0.00555
0.01080
0.02467
Rebalanced
Quarterly
-0.01789
0.00892
-0.01938
-0.01636
-0.01400
-0.00102
-0.01148
-0.01109
0.01981
0.01322
0.00555
0.01080
0.02467
Rebalanced
Semiannually
-0.01789
0.00892
-0.01938
-0.01669
-0.01420
-0.00102
-0.01148
-0.01109
0.01981
0.01537
0.00935
0.01414
0.02467
Average 0.00291 -0.00028 -0.00064 0.00004
St Deviation 0.06660 0.01253 0.01531 0.01591
Absolute Values of Error Term Averages
0.003
0.0025
Hedge Monthly Quarterly Semiannually Monthly
Replicative Rebalanced Rebalanced Rebalanced Reconfigured
Quarterly Semiannually
Reconfigured Reconfigured
Appendix X
All Property Sector Predictive Hedge Error Terms
Reconfigured
Monthly
-0.00969
0.00892
-0.00093
-0.00989
0.00045
-0.00153
-0.01148
-0.01109
-0.00407
0.01322
0.00555
-0.00760
0.02467
-0.00027
0.01087
Reconfigured
Quarterly
-0.00969
0.02753
-0.00093
-0.00989
-0.05516
0.10694
-0.01148
0.07065
-0.01587
0.01322
-0.09344
-0.02958
0.02467
0.00130
0.05097
Reconfigured
Semiannually
-0.00969
0.02753
-0.00093
-0.00989
0.00031
-0.10193
-0.01148
0.07065
-0.01587
0.03468
-0.00074
-0.00369
0.02467
0.00028
0.03931
0.002
0.0015
0.001
0.0005
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All Property: Replicative and Rebalanced Hedges
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